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INTRODUCTION

T

HE passage of the High Performance Computing Act of
19911 authorized the establishment of the National Research
Network (NREN), the successor to the Internet. 2
Education
and
* Clerk to the Honorable Paul W. Tressler, Court of Common Pleas, Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, J.D., Villanova University School of Law, 1992.
Author wishes to thank the editorial staff of the Villanova Law Review for their
efforts on this Article.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 5501-5528 (Supp. 1991).
2. The Internet is a government subsidized computer network that allows

(571)
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The NREN will link computer users the way the telephone system
now links most Americans. Computers and high speed transmission lines, consisting primarily of fiber optic cable, will merge into
an electronic information superhighway providing a medium for
accelerating industrial development.3 Generally, data will travel
this information superhighway in one of three forms: (1) as relatively small files of information-electronic mail (E-Mail); (2) as
large data and program files travelling long distances, either between members of a joint venture or between the offices of a single firm; or (3) as large and small files from firms operating online
4
text data bases (ODBs) to clients that request information.
Although E-Mail is currently the most widely used form of
computer based communication, its viability as an alternative to
traditional communication has been limited by the current lack of
internetwork connectivity. 5 Today's computer networks often
6
provide no means for sending information to other networks.
researchers and educators to communicate with each other. See David
Churbuck, Civilizing Internet, FORBES, July 8, 1991, at 90. The Internet evolved
from Arpanet, a network that was sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency. Amy Cortese, Internet Propels U.S. Research, COMPUTERWORLD,
Aug. 14, 1989, at 105.
3. See Thomas S. Valovic, Can High-Speed Networks Help US Regain a Competitive Edge?, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, June, 1992, at 25, 25. ("At stake is the ability
of the US to compete in new world markets and a radically redefined
economy.").
High speed communication will affect four areas: (1) technology scanning,
which combines computer conferencing and retrieval functions allowing a user
to search through multiple databases to remain up-to-date on the latest breakthroughs in technology; (2) technology transfer, which is the transmission of
technology from one use to another, e.g., file exchanges; (3) product development, which will be enhanced by improvements in access to more information
through technology scanning and efficient technology transfer; (4) dealer and
distributor support, which will be enhanced by linking supply and distribution
networks thereby reducing costs by removing the necessity of a broker or middleman to coordinate suppliers and customers. See MATTHEW RAPAPORT, COMPUTER MEDIATED COMMUNICATIONS 36-38 (1991).
4. See generally RAPAPORT, supra note 3, at 1-44 (describing and discussing
growth of electronic mail, electronic publishing, file transfer and ODBs).
5. See Cortese, supra note 2, at 105 (noting "tremendous impact" of electronic mail on research community). Although electronic mail is cost effective at
speeds provided by ordinary telephone lines, one needs high connectivity to
maximize utility. Id. at 90. Charbuck noted this problem when he wrote:
In theory, you should be able to send a 200 word memo across the
country on a computer network for less than one cent. If you pick up
the phone instead or use a 29-cent stamp, it's probably because your
intended recipient isn't on any electronic mail system you can get to
easily.
Id.
6. Paul Nicholson, National Research Network Advocated in Congressional Testimony, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, Jan. 1990, at 49 (paraphrasing Robert W. Lucky,
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Once fully implemented, the NREN will provide the missing in7
terconnectivity and create a universal high speed E-Mail system.
Large file transfer is to E-Mail what parcel post is to the first
class letter. The NREN will allow users to ship larger bundles of
information at speeds once unimaginable. 8 As a result, as data
transmission speeds increase, users will be able to transfer vast
amounts of data in a cost effective manner enabling many as yet
unforeseeable applications. 9
High-speed telecommunications will also support publicly accessible text databases, sometimes referred to as "online text data
bases," or ODBs.' 0 The last decade has seen significant growth
executive director of Research and Communications Sciences at AT&T Bell
Labs, testifying before Congress).
7. See generally Royce J. Holland, Competitive Local Communications: The New
Landscape, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, February, 1992, at 23 (describing emerging
role of non-Bell telephone companies in providing data transmission and other
telecommunications services).
8. See generally, Valovic, supra note 3, at 25 (describing NREN's role of facilitating technology transfer as key element of future growth of U.S. business into
electronic marketplace in which information serves as currency).
9. See RAPAPORT, supra note 3, at 272-73. Although the actual demand is
small at present, the potential demand for high speed telecommunications
among large and small businesses and universities alike is great. See Advanced
Network and Services, Inc., Formed to Expand National Computer "Superhighway", 7 INFORMATION TODAY 43, 90 (1990) (noting greatly increased demand and traffic

among universities, businesses and governmental research centers). Experts believe demand will increase after high speed transmission becomes available because new uses from higher speeds typically arise only after such speeds have
been introduced. See Paul Merrion, Ill. 's Computer Highway; Small Firms Hit Technology Roadblocks, CRAIN'S CHICAGO Bus.,July 13, 1992, at 13, 15 (indicating that
lack of high speed transmission facilities results in situation where potential
users must refrain from starting projects requiring such speeds, while potential
suppliers cannot find enough user interest to justify cost of creating such facilities). Where higher-speed networks currently exist, they fuel the demand for
products and services to support such applications as large file transfer, graphics
transmission and distributed database access. See generally Gary H. Anthes, Challengers Rise to Internet, COMPUTERWORLD, Sept. 23, 1991, at 49 (comparing U.S.,
European and Japanese high-speed data network projects);Jay Habegger, Why Is
the NREN Proposal So Complicated?, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, Nov. 1991, at 21 (not-

ing growth of Internet use and potential growth of new systems); Joanie M.
Wexler, Study's Bandwidth Projections Belie Some User Expectations, COMPUTERWORLD,
July 1992, at 53 (reporting that Pacific Stock Exchange's data traffic expects to
double every two years to stay competitive with competitors' information flow).
Because of the typically large sizes of programs and data files, their exchange requires high speed networks. The size and distance constraints on file
exchange make it likely that only high speed transmission can satisfy file transfer
demand, precluding consumers from substituting cheaper but slower media.
But see Thomas S. Valovic, Telecommunications Trends: A Yankee Group Roundtable,
Part 2, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, May, 1990, at 75 (asserting that users of networks

want "real time" interaction).
10. RAPAPORT, supra note 3, at 16. ODBs emerged in the 1970s as researchers began storing their documents in electronic form, and random access stor-
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in the number of ODBs, their number doubling between 1985
and 1989.11 LEXIS/NEXIS, the Dow Jones News Retrieval Services, VU/Text Information Services, Inc., the Wilson Line, and
News Net, Inc. are all examples of ODBs. 12 As interconnectivity
improves, consumers will gain access to a multiplying number of
3
information vendors offering more and more ODB options.'
The three uses described above share common components.
First, information providers must create a bundle of data to be
transmitted. This bundle may be a two sentence E-Mail message
or a large data file. Second, this bundle of data must leave the
initiating computer and travel over a transmission medium until it
reaches its destination. The transmission medium will in turn
consist of subparts: a local link plugged into the back of the initiating computer that will carry bundle to the superhighway, which
will then carry the bundle to another local link plugged into the
back of the receiving computer.
This Article focuses on the second component of the transmission medium, the superhighway-the carrier. Specifically, this
Article is concerned with how a user gains access to the highway,
or put more exactly, how the user gains permission to merge an
information bundle into traffic travelling on the information
highway.
Two closely related issues underlie the more general access
question. First, will information providers-information services
companies-be able to gain access to the highway in order to deliver their products? Second, at the other end, will users be able
to obtain products from providers of their own choice or will the
highway owners-the carriers-decide what they will have access
to?
This Article approaches these fundamental issues by dealing
with several narrower questions: Will competition and its disciplining effects characterize the carrier market, or will it develop as
a series of local natural monopolies? If the carrier market develage and retrieval techniques improved. Id. at 13. This information retrieval is
not interactive; the user merely accesses data from a large text base. Id. at 14.
11. Id. at 16. There were only 1100 computer searchable databases in
1985. Id.
12. Id.
13. George Heilmeier, Chief Executive Officer of Bell Communications Research, has called for an information infrastructure to support "information
malls" in which consumers could access entertainment, shopping, medical, business and educational information. Top News, NETWORK WORLD, Feb. 3, 1992, at
2 (quoting George Heilmeier, speaking at ComNet conference in Washington,
D.C.).
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ops as a series of local natural monopolies, will the monopolists
sell access to competing information providers, or will the information-services market also develop as a monopoly, lacking the
disciplining effects of competition that force firms to maximize
quality and minimize price? If a monopolist carrier vertically integrates into the information services sector, do existing antitrust
principles impose a duty on it to provide access for independent
information providers?
Several conclusions regarding antitrust liability in the NREN
industry seem likely. First, high entry barriers will exist in the
NREN. These barriers will cause the local segments of the network to develop as natural monopolies. This will prevent information providers from integrating into, and competing in, the
carrier sector. Second, carriers in the NREN will integrate into
the information-services sector. Third, the local monopolies will
have incentives to refuse to deal with information providers, even
though such refusals will be inefficient. The unanswered question
regarding antitrust liability is whether carriers will act on these
incentives or whether they will accept all efficient transactions, as
firms theoretically do. This Article shows that they may well engage in inefficient denials of access.
This Article looks at the probable structure of the NREN,
compares it to existing industries, and uses antitrust decisions affecting those industries to determine the duties the Sherman Act
will impose on NREN firms. Part II of this Article surveys the
scope of the Sherman Act's duty to deal and sets forth the applicable rules. Part III develops a model of the proposed NREN and
shows that the network will create conditions that satisfy key elements of the Sherman Act. In developing a model of the proposed NREN, Part III confronts the fact that the NREN is a new
technology and that its configuration has yet to be determined.
Nevertheless, courts need not develop new precedent for this new
technology: the analysis in Part III supports the conclusion that
the NREN is conceptually similar to a marketplace, and antitrust
law features a body of precedent that consistently adheres to an
open-access policy. Part IV explores how a dominant carrier
might act to preserve its control of the market and how the carrier
may thus violate Section II of the Sherman Act. Part V examines
the incentives of NREN carriers in the light of an open-access policy. That part explains why NREN carriers might refuse to enter
into efficient transactions with information providers. Finally,
Part VI discusses efficiency justifications for refusals to deal.
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THE SHERMAN ACT AND THE DUTY TO DEAL WITH
COMPETITORS

This part examines the factors that determine whether competition helps or hinders allocative efficiency. It also looks at how
the Sherman Act attempts to promote efficiency by imposing on
firms a qualified duty to deal with competitors. Section A discusses the economic effects of competition, monopolization and
vertical integration, relating them to the purpose of the Sherman
Act, while section B examines the scope of the Sherman Act and
its duty to deal.
A.

Efficiency, Welfare, Competition and the Role of the Sherman Act

1. Competition, Efficiency and the Sherman Act
The Sherman Act reflects our society's deeply rooted belief
that competition fosters both economic efficiency and political
liberty. In Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 14 the
Supreme Court stated:
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive
charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and
unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It rests on
the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic
resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the
greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of
5
our democratic political and social institutions.'
The Court elaborated in National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States: 16 "The assumption that competition is the
best method of allocating resources in a free market recognizes
that all elements of a bargain-quality, service, safety, and durability-and not just the immediate cost, are favorably affected by
17
the free opportunity to select among the alternative offers."'
Thus, the Sherman Act promotes competition so long as it enhances allocative efficiency, but condemns acts that harm competitors without producing offsetting gains in efficiency.
In a perfectly competitive market, price approaches marginal
14.
15.
16.
17.

356 U.S. 1 (1958).
Id. at4.
435 U.S. 679 (1978).
Id. at 695 (relating quoted assumption to Sherman Act).
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Competition induces firms to maximize their productive efficiency
in order to minimize marginal cost, which in turn promotes an
allocation of resources to higher valued ends. 19 As the intensity
of competition increases, so does the incentive for firms to improve productive efficiency, because in a perfectly competitive
market, the more efficient firms drive the less efficient out of business by providing the same outputs at lower prices. 20 For the
18. Elizabeth E. Bailey & William J. Baumol, Deregulation and the Theory of
ContestableMarkets, 1 YALEJ. ON REG. 111, 116 (1984). A firm would continue to
expand output as long as the price was greater than the marginal cost of that
expansion. Eventually, due to diminishing returns, the price and marginal cost
would merge. Id. at 116 n.7.
19. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir.
1945) ("[T]he spur of constant stress is necessary to counteract an inevitable
disposition to leave well enough alone.... [Competitors] will be quick to detect
opportunities for saving and new shifts in production, and be eager to profit by
them.").
Because competition drives prices toward marginal cost, it promotes maximal efficiency in the allocation of resources. See Bailey & Baumol, supra note 18,
at 116. Effective competition may be potential as well as actual; if new firms can
enter a market quickly in response to an entry opportunity, this threat disciplines
incumbents and forces them to behave efficiently. Id. at 116-20. Bailey and
Baumol discuss the benefits of potential competition in the context of contestability theory. Id. For potential competition to exert its maximal disciplinary
effect on a carrier, costless entry and egress must be possible. Id. This relatively
new theory has not yet influenced the legal and economic fields. However, its
observations on the benefits of potential entry apply to the theory of competitive
markets as well, because the perfectly competitive market must by definition allow firms to enter and exit without cost.
20. Id. at 119. Although this Article refers to "price," one should read this
to mean the continuum of price/utility ratios.
Economists define a "perfectly competitive market" as one in which: (a) a
large number of firms provide such a small proportion of the total market output
that no single firm's pricing decisions have a discernable effect on price; (b)
products comprising the market are homogenous; and (c) firms can enter and
exit the market without cost. Id. at 115-17.
Many economists believe that monopoly markets cause firms to experience
internal inefficiency in the form of excessive wages, lower rates of innovation
and insensitivity to rising input costs. Herbert H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Analysis
of Market Power, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEREGULATION: MARKET POWER AND
COST ALLOCATION ISSUES 11 John R. Allison & Dennis L. Thomas eds., 1990)
[hereinafter TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEREGULATION]. These economists believe
individuals and organizations tend to make choices that are "satisfactory" but
not value-maximizing in terms of efficiency. See, e.g., Robert G. Harris and
Thomas M. Jorde, Antitrust Market Definition: An Integrated Approach, 72 CAL. L.
REV. 3, 27 (1984) (noting that "there is abundant evidence that neither individuals nor firms . . . are always rational in the neoclassical meaning of the term").
Economists call this theory of behavior "satisficing" or "bounded rationality."
Id. at 28. This theory assumes that people and organizations act according to
custom, habit and training, considering only the most likely alternatives, and
adhering to such behavior as long as they or their employers are satisfied with
the outcomes, even though those outcomes fall short of optimal allocative efficiency. Id. at 28-31.
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same reasons, in a competitive market, firms cannot reap excessive profits without losing sales to a competitor. 2 '
2.

Monopoly, Natural Monopoly, Efficiency and Welfare

The opposite of a competitive market is a monopoly. Monopoly exists when one firm controls all, or the vast share, of output in a relevant product market and conditions prevent other
firms from entering the market at competitive rates. 2 2 Antitrust
precedent declares a firm a monopolist if it controls more than
seventy-five to eighty percent of the market output. 2 3 For a monopolist, marginal cost approaches marginal revenue at a lower
output than in competition and this lower output results in higher
prices to the consumer.2 4 As a result, when a monopoly exists,
25
society allocates resources to lower valued ends.
There is an exception to the rule that monopoly conditions
harm allocative efficiency relative to competitive conditions. In
some industries, production technologies allow a single firm to
satisfy the total market demand at a lower cost than two or more
firms could. Economists call such a market a "natural monopoly." 26 Once an industry's technology creates a natural monop21. Bailey & Baumol, supra note 18, at 115 (defining excessive profits as
"long-run profits exceeding the cost of capital as determined by the markets for
debt and equity"). As firms cannot earn excessive profits on any product, multiproduct firms cross-subsidize product prices. Id. at 115-16.
22. 2 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW

403a (1978).

23. E.g., Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843, 850 n. 18 (6th Cir.
1979) (citing cases to support holding that 75-80% figure constitutes
monopoly).
24. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH
403b. The
ITSELF 98-100 (1978); see also AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 22,
important result is not the price rise, but the reduction in output, which causes
allocative inefficiency. Id.; see also James R. Ratner, Should There Be an Essential
Facility Doctrine? 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 327, 345 (1988) (stating misallocation
occurs when prices are raised in monopolistic manner as some consumers who
would purchase at competitive price refuse to pay higher price). Yet, supracompetitive pricing itself does not create or maintain a monopoly; it in fact draws
competitors into the market. Id. at 373.
25. AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 22,

403b; BORK, supra note 24, at 101;

Ratner, supra note 24, at 345.
26. See William J. Baumol & Robert D. Willig, Fixed Costs, Sunk Costs, Entry
Barriers and Sustainabilityof Monopoly, 96 QJ. ECON. 405, 409 (1981); see also WILLIAM W. SHARKEY, THE THEORY OF NATURAL MONOPOLY 54 (1982). Even with the

natural monopoly's "dead weight loss" and wealth transfer, consumer and net
social welfare improves when competition changes to natural monopoly. Cf
BORK, supra note 24, at 101 (briefly noting that monopolist's increased efficiency
inures to public's benefit in form of increased output and lower prices).
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oly, competition harms allocative efficiency.! 7 Yet even though a
natural monopolist produces goods at a lower cost than two or
more firms, misallocation of resources occurs as long as the monopolist charges prices in excess of its marginal cost. 28 Another

way that monopoly conditions influence overall allocative efficiency is when a natural monopolist at one stage of production
sells its service to firms in a competitive adjacent stage, it sets a
supracompetitive price that appropriates the full profit available
from the sale of the end product. 29 In order to maximize profits,
30
a natural monopolist sells only to the most efficient firms.
When this happens, the number of competing firms in the adjacent stage of production may diminish. This decrease in competition adversely effects efficiency. First, it reduces the incentives for
incumbents to innovate and improve their efficiency. 3 ' Second, it
prevents the entry of new, non-integrated firms, which are often
more flexible than integrated firms, and often sets the pace in introducing new products, services and processes. Therefore, a
lack of competition and innovation at one level causes an overall
loss in efficiency and welfare.
Antitrust policy seeks to prevent such derivative inefficiency
by ensuring equal access to facilities that comprise natural monopolies.3 2 The decision in United States v. American Telephone and
Telegraph Co. 3 3 exemplifies this policy. After the trial court noted
the company's "substantial domination of the telecommunication
industry," 34 it approved a consent decree requiring AT&T to sell
35
access to all long-distance carriers on equal terms.
In a like manner, if the carriage of information on the NREN
is a natural monopoly, but the provision of information services is
27. See SHARKEY, supra note 26, at 56 (maintaining that introduction of competition to natural monopoly reduces welfare by raising production costs).
28. Id. at 101.
29. See generally Richard Schmalensee, A Note on the Theory of Vertical Integration, 81 J.POL. ECON. 442, 446 (1973) (noting that "the intermediate good monopolist can always be viewed as having a monopoly of the final product as well,
except that his average (and marginal) cost depends on the fraction of the final
product he actually sells").
30. See Ratner, supra note 24, at 351-52; see also DavidJ. Gerber, Note, Rethinking the Monopolist's Duty to Deal: A Legal and Economic Critique of the Doctrine of

"Essential Facilities",74 VA. L. REV. 1069, 1085-87 (1988).
31. See LAWRENCE SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST § 48, at 129 (1977) (competition in
adjacent stage yields price and innovation benefits).
32. Bailey & Baumol, supra note 18, at 123-24 & n.19 (urging reduction of
entry barriers to promote contestability and benefits thereof).
33. 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).

34. Id. at 222.
35. Id. at 142.
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not, then antitrust policy would promote equal access to the
NREN for information providers.3 6 The Computing Act may coincide with such a policy, as the Act promotes access to commer37
cial information services.
As discussed in Part III below, it is likely that the NREN will
develop as a natural monopoly. If this is the case, then antitrust
policy will work to insure that information services providers have
meaningful access to the NREN. One particular concern will be
the possibility that the carriers that make up the NREN will vertically integrate into the adjacent information services market and
thereby extend their dominant position beyond mere carriage.
The next section addresses the concept of vertical integration and
the likelihood that monopoly carriers will move into adjacent
markets.
3.

Natural Monopoly and Vertical Integration

Vertical integration is the combination of two or more stages
of production under common ownership. 38 For example, a telecommunications firm may carry signals on a network and allow
consumers to search for and retrieve information from its computer database. To the consumer, this may appear as a single
process called "telecommunications. ' 39 However, one could
consider such a service as involving two stages of production: (1)
the creation and manipulation of information, such as that which
is offered on databases operated by CompuServe and Dialog; and
(2) the carriage of such information as digital signals through a
telecommunications network such as the NREN. 40 This distinction, between generation and transmission, affects the application
36. While a complete discussion of the information services market is beyond the scope of this Article, it is important to note that the information services market is now, and has the potential to remain, competitive and diverse. See
RAPAPORT, supra note 3, at 60; see also RICHARD M. NEUSTADT, THE BIRTH OF
ELECTRONIC PUBLISHING 60 (1982) (noting that market should be competitive if
electronic publishing proves commercially attractive and if appropriate structural policies are adopted). For example, the last decade has seen strong growth
in the number of publicly accessible text data bases: between 1985 and 1989
their number doubled. See RAPAPORT, supra note 3, at 16.
37. 15 U.S.C. § 5512(e) (Supp. 1991).
38. The concept of vertical integration is very broad and flexible because
stages of production often lack clear boundaries. John Cirace, An Economic Analysis of Antitrust Law's Natural Monopoly Cases, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 677, 692 (1986).
39. See SHARKEY, supra note 26, at 182 (noting that telecommunications can
also be thought of as part of larger information processing industry).
40. NEUSTADT, supra note 36, at 16-17.
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of antitrust principles because of the relationship between vertical
integration and efficiency.
Because monopolists maximize profit by minimizing the cost
of the end product, integration typically occurs only when it improves productive efficiency. 4 ' When the adjacent stage is a monopoly, integration improves overall efficiency by eliminating the
need for non-integrated firms to agree on the optimal monopoly
price. 4 2 By integrating into the adjacent stage, a monopolist eliminates the need to reach an agreement and thus can set an optimal
43
price.
When the stage adjacent to a natural monopoly is competitive, integration by the monopolist can improve overall efficiency
by eliminating the substantial transaction costs that arise when
firms transact business. 44 Vertical integration by a natural monopolist into a competitive, adjacent stage of production reduces
overall efficiency only when the cost of the monopolist's inefficiency in that stage outweighs the savings in transaction costs.
Because the natural monopolist has an incentive to achieve the
41. See Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843, 861 (6th Cir. 1979); see
also Schmalensee, supra note 29, at 449 (concluding that "forward integration
from concentrated to unconcentrated industries . . . is generally profitable").
Vertical integration does not require substantial market power, and, in such a
case, does not implicate antitrust law. Also, vertical integration by a natural monopolist can improve efficiency whether the adjacent stage is competitive or a
monopoly. Byars, 609 F.2d at 861.
42. If a monopolist integrates with another monopolist, the two must agree
how to split the single monopoly profit. Byars, 609 F.2d at 861. However, the
monopolists are not likely to agree on the optimal monopoly price because of
misperceptions regarding their relative bargaining strengths. Id. Misperceptions tend to arise because information is costly and often imperfect. See Harris
& Jorde, supra note 20, at 22-23 & nn. 71-72 (disagreeing with assumption of
neoclassical price theory that quality of information in typical market is high). If,
however, the monopolists at both levels possessed perfect information, they
would know each other's lowest acceptable rate of return and reach a profitsplitting agreement that approximated that rate for one of the parties.
43. Byars, 609 F.2d at 861.
44. GregoryJ. Werden, The Law of the EssentialFacility Doctrine, 32 ST. Louis
U. L.J. 433, 462-63 (1987). Werden particularly noted the savings in contract
and litigation costs when production is within a firm. Id.
The following example illustrates this savings. Assume that Netco operates
a high speed computer network, and InfoLand operates an ODB. Next assume
that, excluding transaction costs, Netco can provide carriage of InfoLand's signals for a marginal cost of $50 per hour, and that InfoLand can provide its ODB
service for $45 per hour. If transaction costs amount to an average of $5 per
hour, the marginal cost for the end product amounts to $100 per hour. If Netco
vertically integrates into the ODB market, it reduces the transaction costs, and
realizes a lower marginal cost for the end good as long as it can produce its ODB
service for less than $50 per hour (including internal costs). The transaction
costs are not eliminated entirely, as a firm that has vertically integrated will retain some administrative costs. Id. at 462.
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lowest marginal costs possible, this should never happen. However, inefficient vertical integration can, and does, happen. Thus,
courts and antitrust authorities should "neither prohibit nor ignore" 45 all allegations of inefficient vertical integration by NREN
carriers into the information sector of the industry. Rather, they
should examine individual cases closely for evidence of gains or
losses to efficiency.
B.

The Limited Scope of the Sherman Act's Duty to Deal

Congress created the Sherman Act in order to protect the
process of competition. 46 Courts apply the Sherman Act under
various doctrines to prevent firms from securing advantageous
access to goods, markets or customers in order to raise prices,
47
lower output and destroy competition.
45. Schmalensee, supra note 29, at 449 (referring to forward vertical
integration).
46. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488
(1977) (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)). This
protection is limited to competition and does not protect competitors. Id.
If a monopolist has refused to deal with firms other than its competitors, its
refusal is not for the purpose of maintaining or creating monopoly power and
thus does not harm competition. Ratner, supra note 24, at 349-50. Consequently, the Sherman Act does not prohibit such "arbitrary refusals." See Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. FTC, 630 F.2d 920, 927-28 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 917 (1981). The Official Airline court cited the "Colgate Doctrine": "In
the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the [Sherman Act]
does not reject the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer engaged in
an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as
to the parties with whom he will deal." Id. at 925 (quoting United States v.
Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919); see also Ratner, supra note 24, at 349-50
(noting monopolist's right to deny access absent predatory incentive).
Thus, if a natural monopolist discriminates against firms in another stage in
the production of an end good, no liability arises.
The absence of a duty to transact business with another firm is, in some
respects, merely the counterpart of the independent businessman's
cherished right to select his customers and his associates. The high
value that we have placed on the right to refuse to deal with other firms
does not mean that the right is unqualified.
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 601 (1985).
47. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion:
Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 215-16 (1986).
Not all instances of advantageous access enable a firm or group to gain power
over price: such power only results when the cost of alternative inputs precludes
competitors from competing effectively. William B. Tye, Competitive Access: A
Comparative Industry Approach to the Essential Facility Doctrine, 8 ENERGY L.J. 337,
347-48 (1987). The alternative inputs constitute a "bypass" of the monopolized
one. Id. at 348. In order to create monopolization, the bypass need not be physically impossible: it need only be economically impractical in the sense that it
precludes effective competition. See id. (stating substantial harm to competition
requires bypass to be impractical or unreasonable). However, the cost of the
bypass will not preclude effective competition if the input constitutes only a
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A firm or group of firms can gain advantageous access to a
market by controlling an essential input. 4 8 By restricting access
to this essential input, a firm excludes competitors by raising the
cost of the input. 4 9 As competitors' costs increase, the firm controlling the essential input achieves power over price. 50 If a firm
or group of firms gains the ability to raise prices "significantly
above the competitive level for a substantial period of time without losing so many sales that the price increase is unprofitable,"
the firm or group possesses "market power." 5'
Under certain circumstances, the Sherman Act imposes a
duty on firms to deal with competitors on a nondiscriminatory basis.52 The rules governing refusals to deal under the Sherman
Act provide the framework for determining the legality of a carrier's refusal to grant an information provider nondiscriminatory
access to the NREN.
Section I of the Sherman Act prohibits concerted action that
restrains trade: Section II prohibits action that monopolizes it. 5 3
The following discussion focuses on how Section II might apply
to refusals to deal by the backbone carriers that make up the highspeed component of the NREN.
Under Section II of the Sherman Act, a single firm incurs liability for refusing to deal with a competitor only when two elements exist: "(1) the possession of monopoly power in the
relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of
that power as distinguished from growth or development as a
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic
acident."5 4 The second element, willful acquisition or maintesmall part of the cost of the end product or if the additional cost of the bypass is
small. See Krattenmaker and Salop, supra, at 243.
48. Krattenmaker and Salop, supra note 47, at 230.
49. Id. at 229.

50. Id.
51. Hovenkamp, supra note 20, at 5; see also Robert D. Willig, Contestable

Market Theory, in

TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEREGULATION,

supra note 20, at 103,

106 (defining market power as "the ability profitably to sustain price substantially above cost").
52. See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing
Co., 472 U.S. 284, 295 n.6 (1985) (stating concerted refusal to deal with competitor might be per se invalid under section one if it placed competitor at severe

competitive disadvantage); United States v. AT&T, 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1360

(D.D.C. 1981) (citing United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383, 411
(1912) and stating that, although antitrust laws do not mandate absolute equality of access to essential facilities, monopolist must make essential facilities
available on terms that place others on level equal with monopolist).

53. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1990).
54. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
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nance of monopoly power, is analogous to the absence of a legitimate efficiency justification, because a plaintiff proves such willful
behavior by presenting evidence that "the conduct was not related to any apparent efficiency." 55
A defendant without monopoly power may also violate
Section II if its refusal to deal amounts to "attempted monopolization." The elements of attempted monopolization-anticompetitive conduct, specific intent to monopolize, and dangerous
probability of success-"essentially track those required for a successful monopolization claim." 56 But proof of attempted monopolization requires a smaller degree of market power than that
needed for a claim of completed monopolization. 57
One theory of liability under Section II currently in vogue is
the so-called "essential facilities doctrine." 5 8 The essential facility doctrine consists of four elements: "(1) control of an essential
facility by a monopolist; (2) a competitor's inability practically or
reasonably to duplicate the facility; (3) the denial of the use of the
facility to a competitor; and (4) the feasibility of providing the
59
facility."
The essential facilities doctrine does not create a new type of
antitrust violation, but instead restates the elements of the offense
of completed monopolization in a different form. 60 The first two
elements overlap. While the first element requires control of an
55. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 608
n.39 (1984) (quoting BORK, supra note 24, at 157).
56. See Delaware & Hudson Ry. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 902 F.2d 174,
180 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2041 (1991).
57. See HERBERT H. HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW,
§ 6.5 (1985).
58. Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles,
58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841, 841 (1990) ("There is much talk these days, particularly
in the context of deregulated industries, about the so-called essential facilities
doctrine ....").
59. City of Anaheim v. Southern California Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1373,
1380 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d
1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1983)).
60. See Illinois ex rel. Burris v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 935 F.2d 1469,
1483 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1169 (1992) (suggesting that essential facilities cases are no different conceptually than cases involving other monopolization theories); Sun Dun, Inc. v. Coca Cola Co., 740 F. Supp. 381, 392
(D. Md. 1990) ("The so-called 'essential facilities' doctrine does not create a new
species of antitrust violation. It simply addresses the narrow situation in which a
firm gains monopoly power by controlling and refusing to deal at one stage of
production, thus extending its monopoly to other stages of production, and
other markets."); Soap Opera Now, Inc. v. Network Publishing Corp., 737 F.
Supp. 1338, 1343 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (stating that essential facilities doctrine is not
distinct claim under Sherman Act, rather form and evidence of the willful acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power); Ratner, supra note 24, at 342, 382
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"essential facility," the second element is part of the definition of
what is an essential facility. 6 ' The third element establishes the
refusal to deal. The fourth element addresses intent, "basically
rais[ing] the familiar question of whether there is a legitimate
business justification for the refusal."' 62
Because the essential facilities doctrine simply restates the elements of a Section II analysis, which this Article employs, information providers who assert claims under the essential facilities
doctrine must confront the same issues this Article discusses
under the traditional monopolization analysis. This analysis necessarily begins with an inquiry into whether the dominant firm has
the requisite monopoly power in the relevant market.
III.

MARKET POWER AND HIGH SPEED COMMUNICATIONS

Refusals to deal will only harm efficiency if the firm refusing
to deal has sufficient market power. Therefore, an antitrust inquiry begins with an analysis of whether the firm allegedly acting
in violation of the Sherman Act actually possesses market power.
In the context of the NREN, if a carrier does not possess sufficient
market power, a trip to the courthouse will not be necessary, as
(noting that essential facilities doctrine is not unique antitrust theory unless
standard of illegality differs from that used to judge refusals to deal).
Further support for this view comes from the fact that the doctrine was extrapolated by a commentator from several refusal-to-deal cases that did not
themselves announce the creation of a new theory of monopolization. Id. at
342-44. Additionally, a number of cases considering unilateral boycotts under
both the refusal-to-deal and essential facilities frameworks reach the same conclusion under each theory. See City of Chanute v. Williams Natural Gas Co., 955
F.2d 641 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct 96 (1992); Consolidated Gas Co. v.
City Gas Co., 912 F.2d 1262 (11th Cir. 1990), vacated, 111 S.Ct 1300 (1991);
Delaware & Hudson Ry. Co. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 902 F.2d 174 (2d Cir.
1990); AT&T v. North Am. Indus., Inc., 772 F. Supp. 777 (1991); City of
Anaheim v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 1990-2 Trade Cas. 69,246 (C.D. Cal.
1990), aff'd, 955 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1992); Eureka Urethane, Inc., v. PBA, Inc.,
746 F. Supp. 915 (E.D. Mo. 1990), aff'd, 935 F.2d 990 (8th Cir. 1991); Sun Dun,
Inc. v. Coca Cola Co., 740 F. Supp. 381 (D. Md. 1990).
61. The first two elements are "simply a different way of describing a 'monopoly of input' or 'an input with significant market power.'" Ratner, supra note
24, at 346.
62. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 955 F.2d at 1380. Whether the defendant can
prove a legitimate business justification that negates the element of intent ultimately turns upon whether the denial of access to the facility was efficient. See
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 608 n.39
(1984); see also Advanced Health-Care Servs., Inc. v. Radford Community Hosp.,
910 F.2d 139, 147 (4th Cir. 1990) ("The key to distinguishing legal exclusion
from improper, or predatory, exclusion, is whether the exclusion was based on
superior efficiency.").
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they will not be able to charge supracompetitive prices or foreclose competition in adjacent markets by refusing to deal.
This part begins with an explanation of how courts determine market power. It then reviews the analytical framework for
determining market power and applies it to the facts likely to exist
in the NREN industry. It also draws analogies between the NREN
industry and similar industries such as telephone networks, cable
television networks, airlines and pipelines.
A.

Determining Market Power

The basic idea of market power is that a firm possessing it
can reduce output and raise prices because there are no close
substitutes for that firm's product. If consumers can readily substitute other, less expensive products in response to a price increase, a firm does not have the power to reduce output and reap
supracompetitive prices. "Cross elasticity of demand" refers to
63
the ability of consumers to turn to other products as substitutes.
On the supply side, if new or existing firms can serve customers at
a comparable price in response to another firm's output reduction, then that firm does not have the power to reduce output
without losing profit. 64 "Cross elasticity of supply" measures the
ease or difficulty firms experience in supplying a service or prod65
uct after another firm reduces its output.
Market power exists, or does not exist, within the boundaries
of the "relevant market." The relevant market is identified by determining the "relevant product market" and the "relevant geographic market." 6 6 Parties then measure the defendant's share of
the relevant market and try to raise or dispel an inference of market power from the defendant's market share.6 7 To the extent
that courts infer market power from a firm's market share, they
tend to do so in unilateral cases when a firm holds a market share
of seventy-five percent or more, 68 while a smaller market share
63. HOVENKAMP,

supra note 57, § 3.3 at 62.

64. Id. § 3.4 at 66 ("A firm with a large share of a proposed market will have
little power to increase prices if other firms can immediately flood this market
with their own output.").
65. Id.
66. Hovenkamp, supra note 20, at 6; Harris & Jorde, supra note 20, at 4.
67. See, e.g., Harris & Jorde, supra note 20, at 4-5; see also United States v.
Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966) (noting that defendant's 87% control
of relevant market constitutes monopoly power).
68. Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843, 850 n. 18 (citing cases that
find monopoly power when defendant holds market share between 75% and

80%).
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suffices in cases involving attempted monopolization or concerted
69
action.
One way to define the geographic market is with reference to
the physical area served by those facilities. 7 0 In the telecommunications field, courts have defined the geographic market with reference to whether physical space is bounded by the bottleneck
networks.71 Alternatively, in Rothey Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van
69. A large market share does not automatically lead to an inference of
market power. See Byars, 609 F.2d at 850-51 & nn. 19-20 (recognizing that presumption of market power that accompanies possession of high market share
may be overcome if entry barriers are low or if high market share is short term,
resulting from innovation). In United States v. AT&T, the court recognized that
the market power determination is affected by factors such as barriers to market
entry, the size of the defendant in relation to its competitors and the nature of
the conduct at issue. United States v. AT&T, 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1347-48
(D.D.C. 1981). The AT&T court relied on all of these factors in concluding that
AT&T possessed a monopoly in the local telephone exchange. Id. at 1348. The
court concluded that the evidence of market share, combined with factors related to barriers to entry, sufficed to meet the government's burden of proving
market power. Id. This placed the burden upon AT&T to rebut "the existence
and significance of barriers to entry." Id. This introduces a measure of uncertainty into business planning, as the legality of a refusal to deal in the NREN
industry may depend on a court's subjective impression of a case rather than on
objective, verifiable indicia of efficiency or competition.
Because available econometric techniques lack sufficient accuracy, parties
have a hard time measuring market power for litigation purposes. Hovenkamp,
supra note 20, at 4. Its measurement is still more an art than a science, and each
of the several methods of doing so suffers from potentially fatal flaws. Id. at 12;
see also Harris andJorde, supra note 20, at 4. This leads courts to sometimes postake
an "I know it when I see it" approach to determining whether a defendant
sesses market power. See John J. Flynn, Discussion: The Legal Approach to Market
Dominance-Assessing Market Power in Antitrust Cases, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS DE-

REGULATION, supra note 20, at 28, 36; see also City of Anaheim v. Southern Calf.
Edison Co., 1,990-2 Trade Cas.
69,246, 64,907-08 (C.D. Cal. 1990)
("[W]ithout explicit guidance as to how to make this determination, some courts
seem to apply an 'I know it when I see it' test based on an examination of the
inherent qualities of the monopolist's structure, service or item."), aff'd, 955
F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1992).
70. At first glance, this may seem to be a mistake because high speed telecommunications appear to create a nationwide market by making transnational
data exchange economical. But if a court adopted a nationwide geographic market, a local or mid-level monopoly network could show that it controlled only a
small portion of this market, and that therefore its refusal to deal did not prevent any information provider from competing in other regions of the country.
In this fashion, every local and mid-level network could successfully defend its
refusal to deal, leaving the information providers shut out of every local network
nationwide.
71. See United States v. AT&T, 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1346 (D.D.C. 1981) (implicitly adopting United States' allegation of local geographic market); MCI
Communications Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1133 (7th Cir. 1983) (implicitly adopting local geographic market by finding local networks "essential facilities"); see also Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 371, 378-79
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (approving plaintiff's assertion that local market is proper area
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Lines, Inc. 72, the court defined the geographic market by first determining whether or not competing suppliers could enter the
area served by the dominant firm and provide services promptly
enough in response to a price increase to restore price and output
73
to their former levels.
In the NREN context, the same result will be reached under
either test. Because each backbone carrier will serve a particular
geographic area, the relevant geographic market will be defined
with reference to the area served. Similarly, once a backbone carrier is in place in a given market, barriers to entry will work to
74
keep competing carriers from entering the same market.
Having determined the relevant geographic market by reference to the physical reach of the carrier, the next step is to determine the relevant product market. A relevant product market
consists of "commodities reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same purposes." 75 Elasticities of demand and supply
define the relevant product market. In the NREN, the elasticity of
demand, the availability of effective substitutes, will vary according to the application. 76 Firms will probably be able to substitute
fax, voice mail or teleconferencing services provided by slower
networks for electronic mail or conferencing services provided
over the NREN. But additional applications that promise to provide new, synergistic joint ventures require large file transfer or
remote computer use, and require high speeds that only the
NREN can provide. 77 The necessity of these new applications for
for examining claims of monopoly leveraging by defendant cable television carrier against plaintiff, program provider).
72. 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1033 (1987).
73. Id. at 217-18.
74. For a further discussion of barriers to entry, see infra notes 104-31 and
accompanying text.
75. United States v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395
(1956). DuPont was charged with monopolizing the cellophane market. Id. at
378. To determine the relevant market for cellophane, the Court looked at
other "commodities that consumers could reasonably interchange with cellophane." Id. at 395. The Court thus determined that the market for flexible
packaging materials was the relevant market for cellophane, and therefore dismissed the complaint because DuPont lacked monopoly power. Id. at 404.
76. See Vinton G. Cerf, Another Reading of the NREN Legislation, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS, Nov. 1991, at 29 ("As always, there will be some sites that are
prepared to apply the highest possible speeds supported by the system and
others that can function adequately with lower speed access.").
77. Although the bulk of high speed applications await development, the
formation of a lobby by U.S. companies to represent their interests in the NREN
shows that they recognize the importance of the network to economic development. See Nicholson, supra note 6. Robert W. Lucky, Executive Director of Research and Communications Sciences at AT&T Bell Labs, commented to the
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continuing economic progress indicates that demand for these
services and the requisite demand for high speed telecommunica78
tions will be relatively inelastic.

Likewise, the cross elasticity of supply for NREN services will
vary according to the particular service. Large file transfer, ODB
file transfer and remote supercomputing services will require high
speed telecommunications technology, because the transfer of
such large amounts of data across long distances at slower speeds
is not economical. The inability of rival carriers to supply these
services at competitive prices means the elasticity of supply will
remain low. The demands for other services such as teleconferencing, video conferencing and electronic mail on the NREN will
probably exhibit a much greater degree of supply elasticity because consumers will be able to purchase such services at economical prices from telephone-based and cable television
networks. 79 These alternatives should constrain NREN carriers
Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space in 1989 that typically
new uses of higher-speed transmission do not occur until the technology to support them is made available. Id.; see also Ellen Messmer, Industry Asks For NREN to
Support Commercial Needs, NETWORK WORLD, Dec. 9, 1991, at 4 (noting that lobby
organization challenged government to go beyond what it has proposed, especially in field of software development).
78. These new applications will be necessary in order for many American
firms to maintain their ability to compete with European and Asian rivals.
Valovic, supra note 3, at 25 (discussing evolution of global marketplace based on
electronic marketplace in which information is currency); A Giant Step Towards
Internet Commercialization, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, June, 1991, at 7 (noting that
NREN is indispensable for creating synergy between corporate community and
research and academic community, which is necessary to bolster United States'
global economic position).
79. The telephone network will compete with the NREN in the carriage of
small and medium sized bundles of information. In the near future, upgraded
Switched Multimegabit Data Service (SMDS) on telephone lines will provide 44
Mbs speeds with wide connectivity, although the lack of optical fiber access lines
to some user sites will limit the actual speed to 1.5 Mbs. Daniel M. Gasparro,
Waiting For SMDS? DATA COMMUNICATIONS 29 (1992). While SMDS is not yet
available in all markets, in October of 1992, MCI became the first carrier to offer
SMDS. Bob Brown, MCI to Take SMDS Over the Long Haul, NETWORK WORLD,
Nov. 2, 1992, at 1, 1; Cerfnet Now Offers SMDS Internet Link, Gov'T COMPUTER
NEWS, Dec. 21, 1992, at 49 (noting that in December, Federal offices in California were able to use Pacific Bell Telephone's new SMDS).
Advances in signal-compression technology is making video conferencing
over telephone networks cost-effective for an increasing number of businesses.
Jim Meyer, You'll Get the Picture: Videoconferencing Saves Time and Money, A.B.A. J.,
Nov. 1992, at 99. In fact, breakthroughs in data compression have reduced
transmission costs from $1,000 per hour to about $30 per hour. Id.
Cable television facilities will also be able to supply slower speeds with wide
connectivity. See Eli S. Lurin, Cable TV Coming to MAN Market, COMPUTERWORLD,
May 18, 1992, at 52. Cable television companies are making a push into the data
communications field by rewiring their existing cable circuits with fiber-optic
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from charging supracompetitive prices for these services and may
prevent the NREN carriers from maximizing the use of their networks or similarly from controlling an essential facility necessary
80
to the delivery of these services.
In summary, it is in the area of high speed, large file transfer
that the cross elasticity of supply and demand will remain low,
thus affording the backbone carrier the ability to charge
supracompetitive prices and to deny access to competitors so as
to benefit affiliated firms. If a network possesses such a dominant
position in the carrier market, it might attempt to leverage this
dominance into adjoining markets, most likely the information
services market. The next sections of this Article delve more
deeply into both these two interrelated issues: (1) how and why
the high speed components of the NREN might develop market
power and, (2) whether, how and why the carriers possessing
market power will discriminate in favor of affiliated providers.
B.

Building Market Power in the NREN Industry

Although the NREN has received much publicity in the trade
press, surprisingly few articles describe what the network will look
like. 8 1 In the absence of a certain outcome, it is appropriate to
assume that the NREN will develop in a fashion that provides the
most efficient use of resources. The optimal telecommunications
network configuration consists of transmission lines radiating like
media. Id. The major drawback at this stage is the cable companies' lack of
experience in providing high-quality data communications. Id.
80. Economical operation of the network depends in large part on smoothing the peaks and valleys of demand. See SHARKEY, supra note 26, at 183-84 (noting large impact of peak-demand
phenomenon on efficiency of
telecommunications networks, as capacity is necessarily geared toward peak demand). Supercomputer users will generate the peak demand on the NREN
while electronic mail, commercial and public users will "fill the valleys" of offpeak demand.
On the other hand, the transactional costs incurred by using different carriers for high speed and low speed applications may reduce demand elasticity
even for electronic mail and conferencing services. Cf Ian Ayres, Note, Rationalizing Antitrust Cluster Markets, 95 YALE L.J. 109, 115 (1985) (discussing how consumers' nontransferable costs create market power by facilitating purchase of
goods from specific firm). In the network market, consumers face many nontransferable investments, including: yearly or one-time subscription or connection fees; learning how to access the network and use its advanced features;
learning how to read the network's bill and use its service cost-effectively; trusting the network's reliability in terms of blocked connections or network outages;
and trusting the network's support facilities when the consumer encounters
problems.
81. See Jay Habegger, Why is the NREN ProposalSo Complicated, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, Nov. 1991 (discussing proposal for construction of NREN).
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spokes from hubs comprised of central switching facilities.8 2 This
design, exemplified by the Internet, consists of a nationwide
"backbone" facility that connects independent mid-level net83
works, which in turn connect independent local area networks.
The NREN will be developed from five "test bed," "backbone" networks that will be the high speed cornerstones of the
network. 84 Thus, although the NREN will have capabilities much
more powerful than those of the Internet, its structure will resemble the Internet's hub-and-spoke design. 8 5 Because of its huband-spoke configuration, the NREN will probably exhibit economic characteristics similar to other hub-and-spoke industries
86
such as the pipeline, airline and telephone industries.
The NREN will resemble a pipeline, in the sense that a product, whether electronic signals, oil or natural gas, begins its process of long distance transportation at a local facility, which feeds
the product into a long-distance network, which then transports it
to a local distribution facility at the intended destination. 8 7 Local
82. See Lee L. Selwyn, Discussion: Contestable Markets-Theory Versus Fact, in
supra note 20, at 123, 128-30. Central
switching reduces the number of links required to connect all network users.
SHARKEY, supra note 26, at 191. In a network with n users, there are n(n-1)/2
possible connections between the different users. Id. To connect all users directly would require as many links as possible connections. Id. If all users can
be served by a single, central switch, only n links are needed to establish the n(n1)/2 possible links between the n users. Id. "In general, the greater the geographic dispersion of groups of customers is, the greater will be the savings in
transmission relative to the increased cost of switching." Id. at 193.
83. See Habegger, supra note 81, at 17.
84. See Ellen Messmer, Agency's Leading-Edge Net to be Cornerstone of NREN,
NETWORK WORLD, May 4, 1992, at 1, 1 (Department of Energy's test bed will
become cornerstone for NREN); Ellen Messmer, NREN is One Step Away From
Reality, NETWORK WORLD, Dec. 2, 1991, at 4 (building of NREN will involve
NASA Sciences Internet); Ellen Messmer, Users' Fears Mount Over NSFNET Upgrade, NETWORK WORLD, Dec. 9, 1991, at 9 (NREN will be built on foundation of
National Science Foundation Network); cf James Kobelius, Following in the Footsteps of ARPANET, NETWORK WORLD, Aug. 26, 1991, at 45.
85. See Habegger, supra note 81, at 17.
86. Antitrust scholars have noted the lack of vigorous competition in other
network industries such as the cable television industry. See Robert S. Gregory,
Comment, Regulating Cable Television-Quincy Cable's UnnaturalApproach to Natural
Monopoly, 31 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 591, 628 (1986) ("Since many of the cable
companies operate multiple systems across the country, a hostile entry would
under normal circumstances invite retaliation or a protective price cut.") (citing
Eli Noam, Economies of Scale in Cable Television: A Multipart Analysis, in VIDEO MEDIA COMPETITION: REGULATION, ECONOMICS, AND TECHNOLOGY 113 (Eli Noam
ed., 1985) (citing Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Predation, Reputation and Entry
Deterence, 27J. ECON. THEORY 280, 280-312 (1982))).
87. See id. (NREN is inspired by Internet, which is composed of local area
networks, which are connected to midlevel networks, which are connected to
backbone). This configuration is similar to the interconnections between the
TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEREGULATION,
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facilities act as "hubs," to and from which the relevant product is
distributed, and intermediate-level and long-distance-level facilities function as spokes connecting the hubs.
This hub and spoke pattern gives rise to the "derived demand" phenomenon: alternative routings between two hubs may
preclude a particular spoke from possessing market power, even
if it is the only spoke that connects those hubs directly.8 8 If a
local hub facility does have market power, however, it then possesses market power with respect to all of the firms that wish to
link their spokes to it. If a mid-level network controls a group of
local hubs, each with market power in its neighborhood, the midlevel network obtains market power in the region it serves. In this
way, networks build market power from the bottom up.
The recent history of competition in the airline industry also
illustrates the effect of local market power on long-distance competition. After deregulation, the airlines adopted hub-and-spoke
configurations. 8 9 The hub phenomenon has promoted a pattern
of extreme market dominance at certain airports. 90 In the airline
industry, the result of the hub and spoke configuration has been
that the airline that owns the dominant hub acquires market
power and charges fares that vary inversely with the level of competition on a particular route.9 Once the volume of air traffic to
a hub along a particular route reaches a "critical mass," the econcomponents of an oil pipeline. See Denver Petroleum Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 306
F. Supp. 289, 293-94 (D. Colo. 1969) (describing this phenomenon in oil pipeline industry).
88. See Donald A. Kaplan, Vertical Integration: Should the AT&T Doctrine Be
Expanded to Other Regulated Industries? 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 263, 265 (1983) (describing "derived demand" problem in oil pipeline industry).
89. Selwyn, supra note 82, at 128; Panel Discussion: Exclusionary Conduct, 57
ANTITRUST

L.J. 723, 727-28 (1989).

90. Selwyn, supra note 82, at 131.
91. Id. at 131-34 (summarizing effect that lack of competition has on airline
fares).
Meanwhile, the industry has grown more concentrated. The three largest
airlines, United, American and Delta, last year accounted for a majority of revenue passenger miles, increasing their combined share by 6% in a year when
overall traffic fell. See Christopher P. Fotos, Summer Traffic Reinforces Domination
By "Big 3" Airlines, AvIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., Sept. 23, 1991, at 28, 28.
"Massive acquisitions" from competitors were the primary reasons for American's and Delta's increased market share. Id. The acquisitions of competitors,
combined with the marketing power of the "Big 3's" routes will increase the
market share of the industry's leaders. Id. Consequently, competition has become competition between a few oligopolist firms. See Panel Discussion: Exclusionary Conduct, supra note 89, at 738-39 (noting that while competition is still
"undeniably strong," it is still not same "incisive, biting competition" practiced
before numerous small airlines were forced out of market).
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omy of the hub-and-spoke design form an effective entry barrier
against other carriers that want to serve the geographic market at
that hub. 9 2 The efficiency of the hub and its sunk cost creates an

entry barrier that precludes cost-effective competition over a particular route unless demand is sufficient to fill a competitor's air93
plane to capacity.
The telephone industry provides another model for predicting the climate for competition in the NREN. In telecommunications networks, long-distance transmission lines, rather than
airplanes, are the spokes. Network switching and transmission facilities are almost totally nonfungible and comprise "sunk costs"
comparable to their acquisition prices. 94 Networks maximize returns on these sunk costs by sharing facilities among the greatest
number of users practicable. 9 5 Moreover, the greater the number
of segments in a hub-and-spoke network, the more fully the network will exploit the capacity of both the hub facilities and the
transmission links, because each link will carry not only signals
starting or ending at its hub, but also those signals that are "just
passing though" on their way from and to nonadjacent hubs. 9 6
97
This produces significant economies of scale for large networks.
Before its breakup, AT&T was charged with using its control
over local telephone exchanges to maintain a monopoly in long
distance service and telephone equipment. 98 Potential providers
of long distance service could not compete without access to the
local exchange facilities. 99 Likewise, potential providers of tele92. Selwyn, supra note 82, at 130.

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
Id. at 133.
Id. at 126.
Id. at 128.
Id.

98. See MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th

Cir. 1983) ("AT&T unlawfully refused to interconnect MCI with local distribution facilities of Bell operating companies-an act which prevented MCI from
offering... services to its customers."); see also United States v. AT&T, 524 F.
Supp. 1336, 1348-51 (D.D.C. 1981). Any piece of equipment not made by Bell
could only be connected to the Bell Network through a protective connecting
arrangement (PCA) provided by the Bell System for a fee. Id. at 1348-49. The

PCA requirement was intended to protect the network as a whole from injury

that might result from "the interconnection of equipment of undetermined origin and quality." Id. at 1348. The PCA requirement was unnecessary and increased prices for non-Bell equipment manufacturers. Id. at 1349. The court
accepted the government's contention that "by controlling who could obtain
PCAs, when, and at what cost, Bell was in a position to control the entry of
potential competitors into the market." Id. at 1351-52.
99. MCI Communications, 708 F.2d at 1133; AT&T, 524 F. Supp. at 1352-53.
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phone equipment could not compete without AT&T's permission
to interconnect their equipment to the network.' 0 0 Control over
the local networks enabled AT&T to control long distance service
and equipment markets because the local facilities were natural
monopolies that competitors could not bypass economically.'10
Transmission speed, rather than gross configuration, will distinguish the NREN from telephone networks. The local and long
distance levels of the telephone network are analogous to the local and intermediate levels, respectively, of the NREN. Thus, the
two will differ only in degree, not in kind.
As noted above, Bell's former monopoly at the local exchange level precluded competition from potential long distance
carriers and equipment suppliers because they required access to
the local exchanges in order to compete. 0 2 In the NREN indus100. AT&T, 524 F. Supp. at 1351.
101. MCI Communications, 708 F.2d at 1133; see also Mid-Texas Communications Sys. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 615 F.2d 1372, 1376 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980) (court implicitly agreeing that duplication of local
telephone facilities would be wasteful); AT&T, 524 F. Supp. at 1353 (local telephone exchanges are "essential facilities").
Commentators who have examined the economics of local telephone exchanges have reached the same conclusion as the courts. SHARKEY, supra note
26, at 206 (noting that "duplication of facilities at the local level is costly ...
[and led to] the gradual consolidation of local natural monopolies within the
industry"); see also Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig, Local Telephone Pricing
in a Competitive Environment, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION TODAY AND
TOMORROW 267, 269 (Eli M. Noam ed., 1983) (noting that duplication of local
facilities would be wasteful); Bailey & Baumol, supra note 18, at 136 (noting that
AT&T decree separated local natural monopolies from contestable long-distance markets).
Local telephone exchanges probably constitute natural monopolies due to
economies of scale in the areas of switching costs and network design and management. The switching facilities in the local exchange are very expensive.
Charles Siler, How to Bypass Your Friendly Phone Company, FORBES, Aug. 21, 1989,
at 89. The high costs and economies of scale associated with switching in the
local network have created a natural monopoly which is demonstrated by the
development of the so-called "metropolitan access networks" (MANs) that purport to "bypass" the local exchange. Id. Without local switching facilities,
MANs can only offer non-switched, dedicated transmission lines to long-distance carriers. Id. Rather than trying to duplicate switching facilities, one MAN,
Metropolitan Fiber Systems, filed a petition with the FCC and the Justice Department to force the RBOCs to unbundle their switching and transmission
services. Royce J. Holland, Competitive Local Communications: The New Landscape,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS, Feb. 1992, at 23 (describing emerging role of non-Bell
telephone companies in providing data transmission and other telecommunications services).
102. See Selwyn, supra note 82, at 132-33 (drawing same conclusion about
long distance telephone market). An industry analysis prepared for the Justice
Department for the triennial review of the AT&T modified final judgement suggesting that the industry would become competitive. Id. at 134 (citing Peter Huber, The Geodesic Network: 1987 Report on Competition in the Telephone Industry (U.S.
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try, firms that offer information services will require access to local area networks in order to reach consumers. Therefore,
information providers stand in relation to NREN carriers as MCI
and other firms stood in relation to AT&T. If local and mid-level
networks operate as monopoly carriers that also provide information, the history of AT&T may repeat itself in the NREN
market. 10 3
In summary, the optimal configuration for the NREN, the
hub-and-spoke design, will create the potential for a single carrier
to dominate either a hub, a spoke or both. That dominate carrier
is likely to possess significant market power in the geographic
market it serves. Whether the structural advantage enjoyed by
the dominant carrier will lead to anticompetitive conduct will depend upon several factors: (1) whether there are significant barriers to entry that prevent a competing carrier from serving a
geographic market served by the dominant carrier; (2) whether
the dominant carrier will refuse to deal with information service
providers wishing to gain access to the market served by that carrier; and (3) if the carrier refuses to deal, whether such refusal is
justified so that it does not rise to the level of an antitrust
violation.
C.

Natural Barriers to Entry

A dominant carrier will remain so if there are significant barDept. ofJustice 1987). However, the analysis seriously underestimated the magnitude and importance of the market share of AT&T and the Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs). Id. at 132-33. It also erroneously assumed that in
the near future a decentralized "geodesic network" would provide economical
bypasses of any given local network, thus eliminating bottlenecks. Id. at 135.
On the contrary, telecommunications facilities are becoming more centralized.
Id.
Other commentators take a more moderate view of competition in the industry. E.g., Barbara Beerhalter, Discussion: Minnesota'sExperience with Inter-LA TA
Competition and Dominance and Other Telecommunications Regulatory Changes, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEREGULATION, supra note 20, at 97, 98 (citing Minnesota Public Utilities Commission investigation that found "rivalrous competition" existed
in market, even though it could not find that monopoly power no longer existed). Perhaps an observation made in 1983 regarding similar disagreements
among commentators remains true today: "[T]he differences [among commentators] seem to depend as much on the writers' philosophical predispositionsbiases, if you will-as on any empirical analyses." Stanley M. Besen, Summary
Comments, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION TODAY AND TOMORROW 417,
420 (Eli M. Noam ed., 1983).
103. The equipment necessary to switch and transmit signals at gigabit
speeds (one billion bits per second) will undoubtedly be even more expensive
than that used by the telephone companies. Because this expense will create
higher sunk costs in the NREN relative to the telephone network, one can infer
that the local segments of the NREN will almost certainly be natural monopolies.
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riers to entry that preclude competitors from entering the market
and offering transmission services at competitive rates. More
generally, an entry barrier is any cost that is greater for a new
entrant than for an incumbent firm.' 0 4 In the NREN industry, potential competitors are likely to encounter entry barriers in the
forms of sunk costs and vertical integration. "Sunk costs are costs
that (in some short or intermediate run) cannot be eliminated,
even by the total cessation of production."' 0 5 Investments that
104. See Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA.
925, 945 (1979); Baumol & Willig, supra note 26, at 408.
The Chicago School approach to antitrust analysis minimizes the significance of entry barriers. Posner, supra, at 936-45 (noting that "the cost to the
monopolist of integrating is ... the same as the cost to the new entrant of having
to integrate"). The Chicago School approach acknowledges that, because of uncertain prospects, potential entrants may face entry barriers in the form of paying higher risk premiums to obtain capital. Id. at 945. Commentators such as
Judge Posner doubt this amounts to a significant influence on price. Id. Posner
notes that interest and profit rarely exceed 10% of a manufacturer's sale price.
Id. Thus, a 10% increase in risk premium would normally cause a rise in price of
less than one percent. Id. Furthermore, if the new entrant is well established in
other markets, the increased risk premium will likely be smaller or nonexistent.
Id. at 945-46. The Chicago School position on entry barriers rests on the assumption that potential entrants face capital costs equal to those of incumbents.
Id. at 936 & n.31. Others, such as Phillip Areeda and Donald Turner, believe
that new entrants are disadvantaged by higher risks and information costs for
potential investors. AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 22,
409e. Potential new
entrants face higher risks than the incremental risk that an established firm faces
when it "mov[es] into a related market involving familiar technology, distribution patterns, and promotional methods." Id. Additionally, the cost of obtaining information about a new entrant is greater than obtaining information
about an established firm. Id. at 304. Therefore, potential investors for a new
entrant will require a greater return on their investment to either compensate
them for the increased cost of obtaining information or to cover the greater risk
created by not having sufficient information. Id. Furthermore, William Baumol
and Robert Willig show that sunk costs create entry barriers because the need to
sink money into a new enterprise creates a difference between the incremental
cost and the respective incremental risks the incumbent and entrant face.
Baumol & Willig, supra note 26, at 418. The incremental cost is that which is
attributable to adding a product line, computed as "[t]he saving in total costs
that the enterprise could efficiently achieve by ceasing to produce that product
line while continuing to produce all else that it had previously." Willig, supra
note 51, at 106. If sunk costs are greater than the difference between prospective revenues and variable costs, then the risk of losing sunk costs deters entry.
Baumol & Willig, supra note 26, at 418-19.
105. Baumol & Willig, supra note 26, at 406. Sunk cost are not the
equivalent of fixed costs. An illustration of the concept helps to distinguish sunk
costs from fixed costs. The cost of an automobile assembly line is a sunk cost
because it cannot readily be sold and its value recovered; but it is not a fixed
cost, because firms could still produce autos by hand on a small scale if the demand for automobiles dropped below the level at which assembly lines are cost
effective. Id. at 407. On the other hand, a railroad must own at least one locomotive and one car. This cost is fixed but not sunk because the company can sell
(or lease) the equipment to a railroad in another market. Id. Some costs are
both fixed and sunk. For example, tracks are necessary for a railroad's operaL.

REV.
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cannot be moved, sold or leased are prime entry barriers. 0 6 The
telecommunications industry features "natural" entry barriers
caused by the need to sink costs in expensive technology.1 07
Vertical integration can also increase sunk costs. 1 0 8 In the
NREN industry, a firm providing information services, if denied
access to a monopoly network, would have to enter both the information services and carrier markets simultaneously. This increases the amount of sunk costs, in the form of capital and
management skills, required to achieve the original goal of providing information services. The increase in sunk costs raises the
rival's incremental risk and associated entry barrier.
Another form of sunk cost is generated by the network externality phenomenon. New networks will probably face a greater
risk of failure than the incumbents with which they compete. In
order to succeed, a new network would have to lure subscribers
away from the old one. This may prove extremely difficult because of the network externality phenomenon.
The value of a network to a consumer depends on the total
number of users and the identities of other specific users.' 0 9 The
larger the network, the greater the number of consumers who will
join it and conversely, the smaller the network, the fewer the
tion, and they cannot be sold in another market, making them fixed costs that
are also sunk.
The greater the proportion of a firm's capital that it can easily sell or lease
(at a price approximately equal to its depreciated value), the lower its sunk costs.
See Bailey & Baumol, supra note 18, at 113-14. The smaller the share of a firm's
capital that is sunk, the more contestable the market. Id. at 114. Industries using capital for which strong secondhand markets exist are likely to exhibit
greater contestability. Id.
106. Id. at 123-24. In the cable television industry, a network industry similar to the telecommunications industry, the high sunk costs of entry have contributed to the lack of competition in the market. Gregory, Comment, supra note
86, at 627-28.
107. Selwyn, supra note 82, at 132-33.
108. The Chicago School also dismisses the role of vertical integration as
an entry barrier. See Posner, supra note 104, at 936-38. Yet others who adhere
to neoclassical price theory acknowledge that vertical integration by a monopolist increases entry barriers by forcing rivals to enter two markets simultaneously, thereby increasing sunk costs for physical plant and management skills,
and thus increasing the entrant's risk premium. See Werden, supra note 44, at
467.
109. SHARKEY, supra note 26, at 126 ("That is, a communication service is
valuable in that it allows communication with a large number of people and because it allows more frequent contact with a large number of close friends.").
For example, a typical user will value both the ability to transfer computer files
to present business associates and the ability to connect with any potential business associate or any publicly-accessible information service.
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number of consumers who will join it.' 10 Thus, the network externality creates a "snowball" effect on the size and success of a

single firm's network. Without interconnections between these
networks, once a firm establishes itself in a market a potential rival can only make significant inroads by convincing consumers to
switch from the incumbent's network to the rival's network. The
entrant may face considerable difficulty doing this because consumers may have made significant nontransferable investments in
learning to trust and use the incumbent network."t' The cost to a
potential entrant of trying to provide utility comparable to the
network externality of a well-established incumbent may present a
2
formidable entry barrier." 1
110. See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition and
Compatibility, 75 AMERICAN ECON. REv. 424, 425 (1985) (noting that "if consumers expect a seller to be dominant, then consumers will be willing to pay more
for the firm's product, and it will, in fact, be dominant"). "These asymmetric
equilibria verify the intuition that a firm may be successful and enjoy a large
market share simply because it is expected to by consumers." Id. at 432.
111. In the telecommunications industry, consumers incur fixed costs when
subscribing to networks. These costs include not only subscriber fees, but the
costs of deciding whether to subscribe and of learning to use the network most
efficiently. These costs may be substantial. If so, consumers will minimize network costs by subscribing to the one network that provides the greatest utility.
In effect, consumers will tend to subscribe to the network that enables them to
perform "one stop shopping" for their communications needs. Telecommunications networks function as "virtual marketplaces," providing a "place" at
which information providers will compete for the chance to sell informationrelated services.
112. Automatic teller machine (ATM) networks provide an example that
illustrates the difficulty a challenger faces in duplicating the network externality
of an incumbent firm. Like other networks, ATM associations exhibit a positive
externality: large networks yield increased convenience to consumers, thus increasing the network's value to the consumer. See The Treasurer, Inc. v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 682 F. Supp. 269, 272 (D.NJ.), aff'd mem., 853 F.2d 921 (3d
Cir. 1988). For this reason, participation in a regional ATM network can make
an account at a member bank appreciably more valuable to consumers than an
account at a nonmember bank. See id. at 271 (noting that membership in large
ATM network can be strong selling point for bank). In a similar manner, the
telecommunications network with the widest connectivity provides the greatest
value to the consumer. Consequently, information providers will want to obtain
carriage on that network.
A recently resolved dispute is illustrative. A disagreement between the
members of the PULSE ATM network led to an arbitration proceeding that examined the role of the network externality in creating market power. The arbitration proceeding was conducted according to federal antitrust law and
precedent. First Texas Sav. Ass'n v. Financial Interchange, Inc., Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1380, at 340 (Kauper, Arb. 1988). Expert testimony
established that a new ATM network could not succeed without providing consumers a level of convenience comparable to that of the PULSE network. The
arbitrator found that a new network could not support the number of ATMs
required to furnish such convenience without achieving "major defections"
from PULSE, and that such defections were unlikely. Id. at 355. These findings
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Several cases implicitly recognize that the network externality
cieates an effective barrier to competition.1 1 3 Although these
cases concern marketplaces rather than communications networks, they do provide apt analogies to the NREN: computer
networks can be thought of as electronic marketplaces in which
consumers can purchase information services from many different
vendors. In this regard, these networks are what economists call
"agglomeration facilities." ' 1 4 When sellers aggregate in central
locations, buyers reduce their fixed costs of shopping."i 5 The reduction in fixed costs results in the familiar preference for "one
stop shopping," 1 6 which has led to the success of supermarkets
and shopping malls. 1 7 The reduction in buyers' fixed costs gives
sellers who aggregate in central locations a competitive advantage
over other sellers.
Marketplace cases, such as those in American Federation of Tobacco Growers v. Neal," 8 United States v. Southwestern Greyhound
ultimately led the arbitrator to conclude that the PULSE network did have market power, even though the complainants could have bypassed PULSE and created their own local network. Id. at 361-62
113. See Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce Bldg., Inc., 194 F.2d
484 (1st Cir. 1952); American Federation of Tobacco Growers v. Neal, 183 F.2d
869 (4th Cir. 1950); United States v. New England Fish Exchange, 258 F. 732
(1st Cir. 1919); United States v. Southwestern Greyhound Lines, 1953 Trade
Cas. (C.C.H.) 68, 355 (N.D. Okla. 1953).
114. Gerber, Note, supra note 30, at 1099 ("Agglomeration facilities offer
either differing products or services (e.g., an artist, a baker and a cabinetmaker)
or several versions of similar products and services (e.g., three bakers).").
115. Harris &Jorde, supra note 20, at 25.
116. Ayres, Note, supra note 80, at 115 (all else being equal, customers prefer buying groups of products at single store).
117. Harris &Jorde, supra note 20, at 25.
118. 183 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1950). In American Federationof Tobacco Growers,
the plaintiff operated a cooperative warehouse for tobacco farmers and the defendant operated the only tobacco auction in the Danville, Virginia area. Id. at
870. The defendant, in order to protect its members from competition, refused
to allow the plaintiff to join its association and trade at its auction. Id. at 870-71.
The plaintiff attempted to conduct its own auction, but failed because none of
the major tobacco growers could afford to send a second set of agents to the new
auction, and none of the plaintiff's members were willing to have their tobacco
sold at an auction where the major buyers were not represented. Id. at 871. The
court had previously found that the presence of a group of buyers representing
the principal manufacturing companies were essential for a satisfactory auction.
Id. at 870. The court found that the defendant's refusal to admit the plaintiff to
its association violated the Sherman Act. Id. at 872. (tobacco association controlled access to local auction and unlawfully denied access to local farming
cooperative).
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Lines,"19 Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce Bldg., Inc.,120 and
United States v. New England Fish Exchange, ' 2 ' show courts implicitly
acknowledging the market power conferred by network externalities. The courts consistently held that the parties that controlled
the marketplaces had to provide nondiscriminatory access unless
a valid business reason existed for doing otherwise. Of these four
cases, none involved telecommunications. But the fact that they
involve four completely different industries shows the universal
application of the concept that unites them. The concept is simply that agglomeration facilities produce a network externality
that, once established, precludes effective competition. Because
firms that seek access to such facilities cannot practicably dupli119. 1953 Trade Cas. (C.C.H.) 68,355 (N.D. Okla. 1953). In Southwestern
Greyhound, several bus companies operated a bus terminal for the use of themselves and other common carriers. The defendants had allowed the Union
Transportation Company (Union) to use their terminal for bus service on substantially equivalent terms until Union began to compete with several of the defendants. Id. at 68,357-58. At that point, the defendants imposed discriminatory
advertising restrictions on Union in order to persuade it to stop competing
against the defendants. Id. at 68,358-59. Employees at the terminal were instructed to not give quotations for any Union operation that Union served by
connection with other lines. Id. at 68,358. In addition, Union drivers were told
to not display signs on the fronts of their buses showing certain destinations. Id.
The court found this discrimination a violation of the Sherman Act. Id. at
68,360 (bus lines jointly operating terminal illegally sought to use their power to
eliminate competitor).
120. 194 F.2d 484 (1st Cir. 1952). In Gamco, the plaintiff operated a wholesale produce business at a building owned and operated by an association of
produce wholesalers. Id. at 485-86. The defendant's marketplace had for years
been the favorite of produce wholesalers in Providence, Rhode Island. Id. at
486. After the plaintiff transferred its stock to an out-of-state competitor, the
defendant forced the plaintiff to quit the premises. Id. The court ruled that the
ouster violated the Sherman Act. Id. at 487. The court based its decision on its
belief that to impose upon the plaintiff the additional expenses of developing
another site and attracting buyers would be "clearly to extract a monopolist's
advantage." Id. at 487. The court ordered the defendant to cure its violation of
the Sherman Act by giving the plaintiff tenancy at the market "on terms similar
to those accorded others." Id. at 489 (lessor that controlled building that was
central market for fresh fruit and vegetables unlawfully denied access to dealer).
121. 258 F. 732 (1st Cir. 1919). The defendants in New England Fish Exchange were wholesale purchasers of fish who ran a market at which fishermen
sold their catches. Id. at 747-48. The concentration of dealers available at that
location proved such an attraction to fishermen that 83% of all fresh fish
brought to Boston were sold there. Id. at 748. The court found that the market
had "a predominating control of all the fresh fish dealt in throughout the North
Atlantic States, rendering it impossible for an outside dealer to build up a business in interstate trade." Id. The court also found that the defendant's rules
unreasonably discriminated against fish buyers who sought admission to the
market. Id. The court decided that such discrimination violated the Sherman
Act and ruled that the defendant could cure the violation by opening the market
"upon reasonable terms to such dealers as may desire the privilege of doing
business there." Id.
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cate them, effective competition in these markets depends upon
nondiscriminatory access.
In the telecommunications industry, the fact that the network
externality can create a natural entry barrier may account for the
difficulty MCI and Sprint are experiencing competing against
AT&T in the long distance telephone carrier market. In 1990,
MCI and Sprint carried fourteen and ten percent of the market
respectively, while AT&T carried seventy percent. 12 2 MCI and
Sprint had achieved small gains in market share prior to 1991,
until a successful advertising campaign by AT&T stopped these
3

inroads. 12

The NREN will be developed through the use of "test bed"
networks that will give the firms operating them an opportunity to
establish a significant network externality before potential competitors arrive on the scene. Observers believe the head start
these firms gain as a result of operating test beds will create sub124
stantial barriers to competition.
Another barrier to entry is the economies of scale enjoyed by
an established network. "When scale economies are substantial,
a new firm must enter at a large scale in order to keep its marginal
cost competitive with the costs of incumbents."' 1 5 When the entrant begins operating on a large scale, the supply increases so
that the market price drops, making it difficult for the firm to re12 6
cover its sunk costs.

In the telecommunications industry, larger networks with
greater numbers of customers can achieve economies of scale that
confer a market advantage over present and future rivals.' 27 Be122. Kate Fitzgerald, Long-distance Guns Loaded, ADVERTISING AGE, Dec. 10,
1990, at 3.
123. B.G. Yovovich, AT&T's the Talk of the Town, BUSINESS MARKETING, Nov.
1991, at 49 (AT&T increased its 1989 marketing budget by 40.3%, spending
almost $40 million in trade and business publications in 1990).
124. See Gordon Cook, Congress Should Reorganize its Priorities Concerning the
NREN, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, Apr. 1992, at 33; IBM. A Bold Networking Gambit
in the "Post-IBM Era, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, Oct. 1991, at 11 ("[Some observers]
suggest that IBM has, in essence, seen the handwriting on the wall, declared the
future of computing to be solidly rooted in data networking, and is moving,
along with bandwidth partner MCI, to lay the groundwork for leveraging the
world's largest data network, the Internet."). While these articles do not expressly discuss entry barriers attributable to the network externality, they acknowledge the advantage that early NREN providers such as MCI, and possibly
AT&T and the RBOCs, will have over their competitors due to their head start.
125. Jonathan B. Baker, Recent Developments in Economics that Challenge Chicago
School Views, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 645, 652 (1989).
126. Id.
127. Selwyn, supra note 82, at 126.
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cause of design and technological constraints in telecommunications networks, a firm that does not enter the market on a large
scale suffers a significant penalty in the cost of designing the system to maximize quality service.' 2 8 As the scale of a telecommunications network increases, economies associated with optimal
design and management increases. 129 Transmission costs are
also subject to substantial economies of scale. 13 0 Furthermore, at
larger capacities, new technologies become cost effective, yielding
3
further economies.1 '
D.

Regulation as a Barrierto Entry

Regulation, and the response thereto by the regulated networks, might create another significant barrier to entry. The
NREN will likely be subject to regulation under the High Performance Computing Act.' 3 2 Under regulation, the local and
midlevel networks may have an incentive to expand their holdings
even when doing so would decrease productive efficiency. This
phenomenon, called the Averch-Johnson-Wellicz effect, occurs
when a regulated monopolist is allowed to earn a rate of return

greater than its cost of capital.' 3 3 In such a situation, the monopolist has an incentive to expand its rate base because the rate of
return on its investment will exceed the cost of obtaining the capital necessary to do so.'1 4 The elimination of any competing firms
would almost certainly enlarge the rate base, resulting in higher
profit even if efficiency decreases.' 3 5
128. SHARKEY, supra note 26, at 184-85.
129. Id. at 191-93 (discussing economies of scale involving central
switching).
130. Id. at 190.
131. Id. at 191.
132. 15 U.S.C.A. § 5511 (Supp. 1992). The statute provides that: "The
president shall implement a National High Performance Computing Program,
which shall-(A) establish the goals and priorities for federal high performance
computing, research, development, networking, and other activities; and (B)
provide for interagency coordination." Id. The statute also sets forth several
activities that the Program will provide: "The program shall-(A) provide for
the establishment of policies for management and access to the network; (B)
provide for oversight of the operation and evolution of the Network." Id.
§ 551 l(a)(2)(A) to (B). Section 5512 establishes the NREN and sets forth access
provisions: "The network is to provide users with appropriate access to highperformance computing systems, electronic information resources, other resource facilities, publishers, and affiliated organizations." 15 U.S.C.A. § 5512(c)
(Supp. 1992).
133. John E. Lopatka, The Electric Utility Price Squeeze as an Antitrust Cause of
Action, 31 UCLA L. REV. 563, 571-72 (1984).
134. Id. at 571-72.
135. Id. at 572.
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The NREN will probably become privatized, i3 6 and may then
undergo some measure of deregulation. After deregulation, the
incumbent firms may retain control over the local networks.
These local networks will probably constitute natural monopolies
that allow their owners to leverage monopolies in the provision of
information services.' 3 7 In an industry that features such "bottleneck" facilities, the bottlenecks may not disappear due to deregulation alone.' 3 8 Deregulated firms that retain control over
bottleneck NREN facilities may prevent effective competition unless the enforcement of antitrust or regulatory duties results in
39
equal access to the facilities on reasonable terms.'
IV.

MAINTAINING MARKET POWER

The second element of a Section II violation is the willful
maintenance of monopoly power. An incumbent carrier will seek
to maintain its dominant position and will engage in various
forms of strategic behavior designed to achieve that objective.
One form of strategic behavior that will act as a barrier to entry is
when incumbents enter into long term exclusive contracts with
select providers. A new carrier may not be able to attract information providers because the top-rated providers may have already entered exclusive dealing arrangements with incumbents.
This form of locking up the market is exactly what happened
in the cable television industry. There, monopolist carriers exerted sufficient control over information providers to make them
discriminate in the sale of programming to smaller, local competitors. The carriers that controlled the sale of programming to alternative media often sold it to competitors at prices significantly
higher for competitors than when selling it to. their own local
cable affiliates. 1 40 The alternative media sometimes received pro136. For a discussion of the federal government's intent to privatize the
Internet, see Churbuck, supra note 2, at 90-91.
137. For a discussion of natural monopolies, see supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
138. Tye, supra note 47, at 338.
139. Id.
140. In re Competition, Rate Deregulation and the Commission's Policies
Relating to the Provision of Cable Television Service, 5 F.C.C.R. 4962, 5022
(1990) [hereinafter FCC Record]. For example, the prices for various programming charged to cable systems versus wireless operators, who broadcast to only
local areas was, respectively, per subscriber: for CNN, $0.28 for the cable operator versus $0.50 for the wireless operator; for USA, $0.23 versus $0.38; and for
the Nashville Network, $0.20 versus $0.35. Id.
One of the smaller carriers, Mid Atlantic Cable Systems operates both cable
and SMATV systems. Id. at 5024. The prices it pays for premium program-
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gramming subject to a detrimental time delay. 4 1 Some competitors also faced total denial of access to programming owned in
42
part by carriers that operated in the same region.
Unintegrated local carriers formed the National Cable Television
Cooperative (NCTC) to secure bulk programming discounts for
members. 143 But none of the major pay-networks such as HBO,
Cinemax and Showtime has entered into master affiliation agreements with the NCTC.' 44 The NCTC believes these agreements
are necessary to secure for its members the same benefits the integrated carriers receive.1 4 5 Discriminatory practices in the cable
television industry have given rise to several suits for monopoliza14 6
tion under the Sherman Act.
Another form of strategic behavior that will solidify an incumbent's position is creating or heightening barriers to entry.
One method of raising a barrier to entry is to raise a potential
entrant's sunk costs.'

47

The larger the incumbent, the more re-

sources it will expend raising this barrier in order to protect its
position. 148 When natural entry barriers are already high, these
additional sunk costs might make the difference between a competitive market and an impenetrable one.
The network phenomena underlies the relationship between
capacity and sunk costs as a barrier to entry. Because the value of
a network to consumers increases with its actual or expected size,
a firm that adds capacity sufficient to serve its market's entire expected growth in demand appropriates the expected network exming, per subscriber for its cable and SMATV operations were, respectively: for
Cinemax, $3.86 versus $6.50; for MTV, $0.17 versus $0.29; and for FNN, $0.17

versus $0.55. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 5025.

144. Id.
145. Id. at 5025-26.
146. While two of them stated claims for monopolization sufficient to withstand motions for summary judgment, the others have not. Sunbelt Television,
Inc. v.Jones Intercable, 795 F. Supp. 333, 334 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (dismissing television broadcast station's claim that cable television system had attempted to
monopolize, but allowing station leave to amend complaint); Viacom Int'l, Inc.
v. Time, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 371, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (declaring that signal carrier stated insufficient claim for monopolization); TV Communications Network,
Inc. v. ESPN, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 1062, 1063 (D. Colo. 1991), aff'd, TV Communications Network, Inc. v. Turner Network Television, Inc., 964 F.2d 1022 (10th
Cir), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 601 (1992); New York Citizens Comm. on Cable TV
v. Manhattan Cable TV, Inc., 651 F. Supp 802, 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (asserting
that citizens committee stated claim for monopolization against signal carrier).
147. Baumol & Willig, supra note 26, at 416-17.

148. Id. at 416.
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ternality by signaling to consumers that it stands ready to increase
connectivity as soon as the potential demand becomes actual.
This increases the perceived value of the network to consumers.
In order to compete effectively, a potential entrant must offer
consumers comparable value in terms of connectivity.' 4 9 This requires the potential rival to enter on a larger scale, increasing its
sunk costs. By intentionally expanding capacity in order to increase a potential entrant's sunk costs,' 5 0 the incumbent increases
entry barriers. 151
Expanding capacity may be a particularly effective method of
establishing an insurmountable entry barrier by increasing sunk
costs because the sunk costs of physical facilities in the telecommunications industry are high. 152 But whether a specific expansion of capacity violates the Sherman Act depends on whether it
harms or helps allocative efficiency. Expansion of capacity can be
either a predatory act or an efficient and socially desirable one,
because networks minimize the fixed costs associated with the in53
stallation of network facilities by anticipating future demand.'
Thus, courts must evaluate such acts carefully before declaring
them violations of the Sherman Act.
149. Economies of scale make it unlikely that a firm could offer consumers
lower value in terms of connectivity at a lower price that would give them a
comparable overall ratio of utility to cost.
150. Baumol & Willig, supra note 26, at 416-17.
151. In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2nd Cir.
1945), the defendant aluminum producer used this tactic to prevent entry into
the aluminum ingot market. Id. at 430. This tactic should have a stronger effect
in a network industry, because the value of the incumbent's service in a nonnetwork industry does not increase as the incumbent's capacity increases. Conversely, in a network industry, the value of using the network rises significantly
as the number of potential and actual users rises.
As long as a firm has market power in one geographic area, it can crosssubsidize the expense of expanding its capacity in another. In fact, RBOCs may
already be doing this in their own markets. Some local telephone companies are
installing optical fibers rather than copper wiring in new residential construction. Gary Slutsker, End Run, FORBES, Aug. 7, 1989, at 124, 124. The high capacity optical fibers cost slightly more than the lower capacity copper wiring, and
give the homes enormous excess capacity. Id. One utility has justified its expansion to regulators by citing a rapid increase in residential second lines for
modems, faxes and telephones for teenagers. Id. But the RBOCs have a not-sohidden agenda: to create sufficient residential capacity to provide homes with
cable television, medical monitoring, home management systems, online text
databases, online Yellow Pages and online transaction processing using RBOC
processing centers. Id. at 124-25; Jan Jaben, Bracingfor a Donnybrook, Bus. MARKETING, Nov. 1991, at 50, 50. By deploying optical fibers in homes before the
advent of a strong residential telecommunications market, the RBOC's may inhibit other potential entrants.
152. Selwyn, supra note 82, at 132-33.
153. SHARKEY, supra note 26, at 190.
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An incumbent may also raise sunk costs by forcing an entrant
to defend sham litigation. The defendant electrical utility in Otter
Tail Power Company v. United States 15 4 used this tactic to prevent
municipalities from entering its market.' 55 The total cost of such
litigation depends on the length and outcome of the procedure.
The uncertainty of the outcome, added to the typically large cost
of legal representation, makes litigation a potentially large sunk
cost. This sunk cost increases the entrant's incremental risk,
thereby raising an entry barrier.
Another way to increase sunk costs is through the use of standards. Industry-created standards have several beneficial effects,
but performance standards could be used merely to increase sunk
costs and raise entry barriers. 156 For example, if a group of carriers and information providers agreed on an arbitrary set of performance standards, compliance with the standards and the
associated costs and delay of the certification process could add
to the sunk costs of deploying a network or information service.
Litigation to resolve disputes over denials of certification would
create additional sunk costs.
Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. 157 established that a standards-setting organization may not apply its
standards in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner. 58 Consequently, an arbitrary decision that results in a refusal by carriers
to carry an information provider, or by a group of information
providers to serve users through a certain carrier, would violate
the Sherman Act.
A final potential method of increasing a new entrant's sunk
costs is through the use of advertising. Experts disagree whether
an incumbent can use an advertising blitz to force new firms to
sink capital in advertising. 159 Empirical evidence in the telecom154. 410 U.S. 366, reh'g denied, 411 U.S. 910 (1973).
155. Id. at 372.
156. One example of the beneficial effect of industry-created standards is
that they improve the utility and safety of goods. HOVENKAMP, supra note 57,
§ 10.3 at 286. The standards aid consumers by substantially reducing information costs and consumer search costs. Cirace, supra note 38, at 703.
157. 364 U.S. 656 (1961).
158. Id. at 659-60.
159. The Chicago School does not believe that advertisement and product
differentiation create entry barriers: "The underlying assumption is that consumers are irrational and manipulable, and the Chicago theorist rejects this assumption as inconsistent with the premises of price theory." Posner, supra note
104, at 930. Others who take a more pragmatic approach to economic behavior
believe consumers seek qualitative rather than quantitative information about

products, and consequently regard advertising as having more influence and
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munications industry shows that advertising does indeed affect
competition. AT&T spends over $500 million a year on advertising, much of it in trade journals. 160 The telecommunications giant increased its advertising budget forty percent in 1990 and
succeeded in stopping market inroads by its competitors MCI and
Sprint. 16 1 Advertising may be especially effective for raising entry
barriers in the telecommunications industry because consumers
will base their network choice on how many other consumers they
16 2
believe will choose the network.
V.

EXTENDING MONOPOLY POWER INTO THE INFORMATION
SERVICES FIELD

A Section II violation also results if a carrier possessing monopoly power attempts to use this monopoly power in the carrier
market to create a monopoly in the information services market.
The dominant carrier will achieve this result by refusing to deal
with competing information service providers, thereby foreclosing their access to the consumer market. In theory, this will only
happen if doing so would increase productive and allocative efficiency. Yet experience in the cable television and telephone industries leads to the opposite conclusion. The cable television
and telephone experiences illustrate how and why a dominant
carrier might refuse to deal with competitors in the adjacent in63
formation services stage.'
A.

The Cable Television Experience

Cable television carriers resemble telecommunications carriers in that both transmit information from an information provider to a consumer. In the cable television industry, the
information providers are firms that create television programs,
such as HBO and CNN. In the high speed telecommunications
industry, the information providers are firms that operate ODBs,
power. Richard R. Nelson, Comments on a Paper by Posner, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 949,

950-51 (1979). Nelson notes that consumers seek information beyond price and
"certain easily specifiable product attributes," and states that advertising focuses
on "consumer uncertainty regarding what kind of a product would be nice to
have, taste and live with." Id. at 950.
160. B. G. Yovovich &JanJaben, AT&T's the Talk of the Town, Bus. MARKETING, Nov. 1991, at 49, 49.
161. Id.
162. Katz and Shapiro, supra note 109, at 425.
163. For a discussion of the cable television and telephone experiences, see
infra notes 164-81 and accompanying text.
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remote supercomputing services, electronic mail services and
teleconferencing services.
In the cable television industry, monopolist carriers tend to
carry fewer programmers than they would if they had to compete
with other carriers.' 6 4 This phenomenon occurs due to the interplay between the consumer's willingness to substitute information and the carrier's strategy for minimizing transaction costs. A
carrier will deal with the smallest number of program providers
needed to achieve maximum viewer levels. This, in turn, minimizes the carrier's costs. Consequently, a monopolist carrier will
not add additional channels beyond a certain number because
there will be no corresponding increase in the number of viewers;
the channels merely compete with each other to attract the great16 5
est share of the maximal number of viewers.
A study of the cable industry by the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) examined the information-carrying and information-producing stages of the industry. 166 The Commission
concluded that ensuring program suppliers fair and equal access
to carriage on cable and competing video media is essential for
67
enhancing the diversity of programs available to consumers.'
The FCC study found that cable systems posses "varying degrees of market power in local distribution." '6s Those with the
greatest market power have also expanded widely through geographic areas and many have integrated vertically by acquiring
equity interests in program providers.' 69 The FCC study concluded that the present level of local concentration enabled large
carriers to take anticompetitive action against program providers
70
and competing signal-carrying media.'
164. Eli M. Noam, Local DistributionMonopolies in Cable Television and Telephone

Service: The Scope for Competition, in

TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION TODAY

TOMORROW 351, 354 (Eli M. Noam ed., 1983).
165. Id. Monopolist carriers do not gain from increasing the number of
channels beyond the point at which the total number of viewers stops increasing,
even though in a competitive market they would offer more channels in order to
lure viewers away from competing carriers. Id.
166. FCC Record, supra note 140, at 4962.
167. Id. at 5021.
168. Id. at 5003.
169. Id. at 5006-07. One expert has stated that as a result of the market
power of carriers in local markets nationwide, it is almost impossible to start a
cable program service without surrendering an equity interest to the owners of
the large carriers. See Donna N. Lampert, Cable Television: Does Leased Access Mean
Least Access? 44 FED. COM. L.J. 245, 260-61 (1992).
170. FCC Record, supra note 140, at 5011. The study expressed a concern
that the anticompetitive action may undermine competition in all areas of the
industry. Id.

AND
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Anticompetitive action includes offering affiliated information providers contract terms more favorable than those offered
to independent providers.' 7 ' Almost all of the contracts examined by the FCC gave the carriers "deletion rights" against independent programmers, but these deletion rights were either
absent or significantly curtailed in contracts with affiliated programmers.' 72 Some program service contracts between the large
carriers and independent programmers expressly state that affiliated programming will receive preferential treatment over in73
dependent programming.'
In the context of the NREN, the backbone carriers might similarly discriminate in favor of affiliated entities and cause a net
decline in the number of information providers from whom a consumer may choose. Reducing the number of information providers in the network will reduce competition that would otherwise
produce a greater variety of information, more powerful search
and retrieval features, and interfaces that are more user friendly.
These losses may significantly reduce the economic gains that the
NREN was intended to produce. 7 4
Two examples demonstrate the accuracy of this conclusion. In the first, after the USA Network (USA) attempted to negotiate a rate increase, Jones Intercable (Jones) removed USA from many of its local distribution systems,
replacing it with the costlier TNT network, in which Jones had an equity interest.
USA v. Jones Intercable, Inc., 729 F. Supp. 304, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). The removal resulted in a breach of contract judgement againstJones. Id. at 319. This
occurred despite the fact that an independent agency found USA the most
highly viewed programmer on the Jones cable system. FCC Record, supra note
140, at 5030.
In another case, CNBC, a new all news service, tried to obtain carriage on
cable systems. When it did so, a large number of the carriers required that
CNBC's programming not compete with the general news service offers by
CNN. Id. at 5028. CNN is owned in part by several of the largest carriers. Id.
The programming restrictions finally agreed upon by CNBC do not prohibit it
from competing with FNN or ESPN, both independently owned. Id. at 5029.
171. Id. at 5029.
172. Id. Deletions are defined as "the right to discontinue carriage of a
program service if it modifies its content in a manner inconsistent with the program description set forth in the affiliation agreement." Id.
173. Id.
174. Although market domination by a few carriers has led to problems for
many independent programmers, a few others, such as ESPN and USA, have
made themselves so desirable that they have obtained carriage on many integrated cable systems, despite their status as independent companies. Id. at
5027. One can infer from this that monopolization of local NREN networks
would not completely eliminate competition among information providers,
although it probably would curtail it. Nevertheless, a carrier need not eliminate
competition in order to raise prices profitably: it need only limit it to a level that
facilitates collusion. Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 47, at 244.
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Regulation and the AT&T Experience

Regulation may also create an incentive for firms to refuse to
deal with buyers in adjacent markets. If a firm's selling price is
regulated, but the prices in the buyer's market are not, the firm
may integrate into the unregulated market and reap its monopoly
profit there.' 75 For example, if a carrier's rates are capped by regulation, the carrier may refuse to deal with independent information providers and instead deal only with those in which it has an
equity interest, allowing it to capture supracompetitive profit in
the downstream market.
AT&T's carrier monopoly raised similar concerns with respect to competition in supplying information services through
the telephone network. The modified final judgment after
AT&T's divestiture prohibited AT&T and its local Bell subsidiaries from both carrying information and providing it as a publisher. 17 6 But on July 25, 1991, Judge Greene lifted this
restriction. 77 RBOCs will soon provide information services
such as medical monitoring, home management systems, education, entertainment, advertising, shopping, banking, and database
distribution and retrieval in voice format. 178 Providers of information services such as Dialog, McGraw Hill, Inc., Dow Jones &
Co., Inc., and Reuters America are monitoring this situation
closely.' 7 9 Some firms in this industry fear the RBOCs will use
their monopoly power in the local exchange to drive out competing information providers. 8 0 Some observers of the NREN's development believe that integration into the information-provider
sector by firms in the carrier sector raises the same policy concerns that resulted in the line of business restriction on AT&T.' 8 '
175. 3 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW
726e
(1978).
176. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 131, 23132 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd, Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
177. Jaben, supra note 151, at 50.
178. Id. at 53; New Jersey Bell Cable TV Project Signals New Step in Bell Atlantic's
Information Services Strategy, PR NEWSWIRE 1, Nov. 16, 1992.
179. Jaben, supra note 151, at 50, 52.
180. Id. at 50.
181. Thomas S. Valovic, The NREN Enigma: A New National Network, TELECOMMUNICATIONS,

Jan. 1992, at 13. Some observers, such as Mitch Kapor,

founder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, an organization that monitors
communications policy issues, see more danger. Id. Others, such as Brian
Kahin of the Information Infrastructure Project at Harvard University's Kennedy
School of Government, perceive little threat to competition in the information
sector. Id.
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Identifying a Refusal to Deal

Assuming that a dominant carrier has the capability and desire to discriminate in favor of affiliated enterprises, the competing information services provider will be without remedy unless it
is able to identify actual discrimination. The most likely form of
discrimination is some sort of refusal to deal. The challenge is to
identify when an actionable refusal has occurred.
The term "refusal to deal" begs the question "on whose
terms?" The fact that two parties cannot reach mutually agreea-

ble terms of access suggests that access would be inefficient. 8 2 A
price set too low results in over-consumption, 8 3 while a price set
too high achieves the same result as an outright refusal to deal.' 8 4
May a network refuse to deal with an information provider that
cannot pay the price of carriage? If the carrier charges a competitive price for access to the network, the answer should be yes. For
example, lack of fiscal security can justify a defendant's refusal to
deal with a plaintiff. Courts will reject such a defense, however, if
it appears to be a ruse to cover anticompetitive behavior. 85
On the surface, this issue appears simple, but complex
problems arise when one confronts the underlying problems:
What defines a competitive price, and should a court err on the
side of finding a price competitive or supracompetitive? This section looks at the issues involved in determining whether a refusal
to deal at a particular price is a violation of the Sherman Act or
merely a refusal to provide a free ride. Anticompetitive behavior
182. In theory, a vertically integrated monopolist can set a price for its intermediate good that captures the full monopoly profit from the sale of that
good. For a discussion of vertical integration, see supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text. Monopolists maximize profit by maximizing productive efficiency,
which in turn minimizes the marginal cost of the end good. Because the Coase
theorem teaches that one can expect firms to make all available, efficient deals,
the fact that a monopolist refuses to deal with a firm at an adjacent stage suggests that such a deal would be inefficient. Gerber, Note, supra note 30, at 1085.
183. Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210,
222-23 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (discussing harms associated with free riding), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1033 (1987).
184. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 766 F.2d 1107, 1114
(7th Cir. 1988) (discussing effect of price discrimination on competition between
market players).
185. For example, in Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce Building,
Inc., 194 F.2d 484 (1st Cir.), cert denied, 344 U.S. 817 (1952), the defendant refused to deal with the plaintiff after the plaintiff transferred its stock to a secured
party that was a competitor of the defendant. Id. at 486. The defendant
claimed that this transfer was an indicator of the plaintiff's lack of fiscal soundness, and that it was justified in refusing to deal with a firm in such a condition.
Id. at 488. The court found the proffered justification a sham, because the transfer actually increased the defendant's likelihood of receiving payment. Id.
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with regard to the price of access will most likely take the form of
price discrimination and price squeezes.
An integrated carrier could practice price discrimination
against information providers in order to maximize monopoly
profit. Because the carrier would control the network, it would be
able to detect arbitrage. The ability of a firm to practice price
discrimination and prevent arbitrage serves as evidence of market
power.'8 6 If the discrimination led to output reduction, it would
constitute an anticompetitive act and result in antitrust liability in
the absence of some other valid business reason for refusing to
deal at a lower price.
In theory, price discrimination usually leads to increased output, but the cable television analogy to the NREN shows that denials of access may lead to output reduction in terms of diversity
of information providers. 8 7 Thus, the unusual circumstances of
the NREN industry may present an exceptional case in which
price discrimination violates Section II of the Sherman Act. Because this behavior may lead to increased as well as decreased
output, courts should be careful not to apply standards of illegality that would discourage efficient business practices.
The second form of anticompetitive pricing, the "price
squeeze," arises when a vertically integrated carrier, rather than
engaging in price discrimination, raises prices to all downstream
operations, including its own. When the carrier decides to obtain
all of its profit from its upstream operation it "squeezes" the full
monopoly profit from the downstream operations. 8 8
186. See Hovenkamp, supra note 20, at 11 (asserting that firm has no market
power if it cannot prevent arbitrage under its price discrimination scheme).
187. AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 175, 725e.
188. Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in
Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17 (lst Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 1337 (1991), rejected the price squeeze as a theory of monopolization
in the electrical power industry. Id. at 25, 31-32. This holding may not apply to
the NREN, because it is limited to "fully regulated" utilities. Id. at 29.
The Concord decision rests on three assumptions: utility price regulation
greatly reduces the harm produced by entry barriers because prices are regulated at reasonable levels; legal constraints are more substantial entry barriers
than economic constraints; and that even if there was substantial competition in
the regulated market, one electrical distributor cannot supplant another without
permission from the regulatory agency. Id. at 26. The Concord opinion also took
issue with the "equal profit at both levels" rule of price discrimination law. Id. at
27. The opinion recognized that different levels of risk at each level would justify different rates of return. Id. But this argument cuts against NREN carriers,
whose natural monopolies and government-subsidized development minimize
risk, while the potentially competitive conditions in the information-services sector create a higher level of risk.
The first of three assumptions is questionable, because monopoly pricing
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A price squeeze exists when the ratio of a firm's wholesale
price to its marginal cost of wholesale service exceeds the ratio of
the firm's retail price to the marginal cost of retail service.' 8 9 Because the calculation of marginal cost may be impracticable, 90
courts may employ a surrogate definition: A price squeeze exists
if the ratio of the revenue derived from wholesale service to the
total historic cost of wholesale service exceeds the ratio of revenue derived from retail service to the total historic cost of retail
service. 9 1
Some commentators believe price squeezes rarely harm allocative efficiency. 192 Others, however, recognize that allocative efficiency suffers whenever a monopolist charges prices far above
its marginal cost. 193 Therefore, dynamic efficiency could suffer
because it is difficult to predict when a price squeeze will be fatal
to competitors, 94 and deny access at a competitive price to those
19 5
firms that could have afforded it.
This would tend to slow the
pace of innovation, because it would mainly affect smaller firms,
which tend to lead in the area of innovation.
Not all of the effects of a price squeeze are negative. For example, a price squeeze may spur innovation by firms that must
find substitutes for the monopolist's services. 196 Similarly, deoccasionally exists in regulated industries. Hovenkamp, supra note 20, at 17.
The other two assumptions appear not to apply to the 'elationship between carriers and information suppliers in the NREN industry. The NREN will probably
exhibit economic constraints that completely bar entry into the carrier market,
and the provision of information will probably not be regulated, or at least not
to the degree to which electrical transmission is regulated.
189. Lopatka, supra note 132, at 588. This can be expressed mathematically
as Pw/MC, > Pr/MCr, where P. stands for wholesale price, MC,stands for wholesale marginal cost, Pr stands for retail price, and MC, stands for retail marginal
cost. Id.
190. Id. at 590.
191. Id. at 590-94.
This can be expressed mathematically as
Rw/TCw > Rr/TCr, where R, stands for wholesale revenue, TC, stands for wholesale total historical cost, Rr stands for retail revenue, and TCr stands for retail
total historical costs.
192. E.g., AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 175, 728 ("[I]t is critically important to realize that not all price squeezes are invidious. Most are not."); Ratner,
supra note 24, at 345 n.102 (as long as sale occurs, allocative efficiency is not
harmed, regardless of terms of sale).
193. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 24, at 101 (noting that misallocation is "the
evil of monopoly" and occurs because of gap between monopolist's marginal
cost and selling price); Lopatka, supra note 132, at 589 (stating that price
squeezes misallocate resources whether or not they eliminate competitors at
stage adjacent to natural monopoly).
194. Lopatka, supra note 132, at 589.
195. Ratner, supra note 24, at 353 & n.124.
196. Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 47, at 279 (noting that "the monop-
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priving firms of the opportunity to reap supernormal profits
reduces incentives to innovate. 197 Finally, the charging of a monopoly price is not by itself illegal, because supracompetitive
profits draw competitors into a market.' 9 8
These positive effects are not likely to arise in the NREN industry for two reasons. First, the nature of the demand precludes
substitution, while the sizeable entry barriers in the carrier sector
will probably prevent new entry. Second, while monopoly profit
may be necessary to attract investment in risky new ventures, the
development of the NREN through federally-subsidized test-beds
mitigates this problem.19 9
Some commentators voice concerns that courts are illequipped to determine whether the defendant's price of access is
in fact too high to justify.2 0 0 While this merits consideration,
courts still face the duty to adjudicate disputes arising under the
Sherman Act. 20 ' Moreover, this concern presents the greatest
difficulty in industries in which products show some degree of differentiation. These situations force courts to look for industry
norms by "comparing apples with oranges." The service provided by carriers in the NREN, the high speed transmission of
information, is highly fungible.2 0 2 This should enable a court to
determine a competitive cost by looking at the costs of other networks in the NREN.
oly rent transfer may induce innovation and further cost savings by
competitors").
197. Areeda, supra note 58, at 851 (citing Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980)).
198. See United Air Lines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 766 F.2d 1107,
1114-16 (7th Cir. 1985) (exercise of monopoly power by firm that is not natural
monopoly encourages others to provide better service in order to attract customers); Ratner, supra note 24, at 373 (stating that firms that must charge prices
higher than competitive price may still enter market).
199. See Werden, supra note 44, at 473 (imposing ceiling on rate of return
eliminates some incentive for risky investment, but this argument is weak if level
of risk is slight); Ratner, supra note 24, at 374 ("Innovative activity that improves
or invents a product should still be undertaken if a normal return will justify the
investment.")
200. AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 175, 729c.
201. Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843, 864, n.57 (6th Cir. 1979)
("[Clourts must be careful not to abdicate their responsibilities under the Antitrust laws in the name of expedience. When the adverse effect of allowing a
monopolist to maintain certain practices is clear, a court should stay its hand
rarely, if ever.")
202. See Hovenkamp, supra note 20, at 22. Hovenkamp states that long distance telephone service is "very fungible." Id. Because long distance telephone
service and high speed telecommunications service differ in degree rather than
in kind, the latter should be fungible as well.
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If carriers in the NREN behave like their counterparts in the
regulated utility industry, the price squeeze will be a key indicator
of anticompetitive conduct. Although in regulated industries a
price squeeze claim is often accompanied by other evidence
of anticompetitive intent, the price squeeze allegation is. often the
heart of antitrust complaints. 20 3 One commentator has
speculated that "if the price squeeze is deemed an insufficient basis of liability, few utility monopolization claims would be
brought, other conduct being specious, unprovable, or equally
20 4
insufficient."
The foregoing discussion establishes three conclusions about
price squeezes in the NREN industry. First, the price squeeze will
probably be a key indicator of anticompetitive conduct. Second,
courts will likely be able to distinguish a price squeeze from a
competitive price. Third, price squeezes will only have negative
effects. These negative effects, diminution of innovation and
diversity in the information-provider sector of the industry, run
counter to the Computing Act's policy that seeks to maximize
innovation. 20 5 For these reasons, courts should find that price
squeezes in the NREN industry are evidence of monopo20 6
lization.
A prohibition against price squeezes would prevent some
inefficient refusals to deal caused by the-defendant's asking price,
but courts must be wary of plaintiffs who seek to use the Sherman
Act to obtain a free ride. Courts must watch that their remedies
do not set a price below that at which the carrier can earn a com203. Lopatka, supra note 133, at 605.
204. Id. at 605-06.
205. In section 5512(e) of the Computing Act, Congress implicitly adopts a
policy favoring diversity of information services, including commercial information services. Section 5512(e) provides:
The Director shall assist the President in coordinating the activities of
appropriate agencies and departments to promote the development of
information services that could be provided over the Network. These
services may include the provision of directories of the users and services on computer networks, data bases of unclassified Federal scientific
data, training of users of data bases and computer networks, access to
commercial information services for users of the Network, and technology to support computer-based collaboration that allows researchers
and educators around the Nation to share information and
instrumentation.
15 U.S.C.A. § 5512(e) (West Supp. 1992).
206. Courts would be more likely to reach this result if Congress were to
create an explicit requirement that NREN carriers provide "just and reasonable"
rates on a nondiscriminatory basis. Congress has imposed such a duty on electrical utilities under the Federal Regulation and Development of Power Act, 16
U.S.C. § 824d (1988).
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petitive return on its investment. A defendant's inability to earn a
competitive return on its investment justifies its refusal to deal at
20 7
the plaintiff's asking price.
At the core of any discussion about "reasonable" pricing is
the question of whether a court has better information than parties engaged in a free bargaining process. If a court reaches an
erroneous conclusion, the resulting order produces inefficiency
accompanied by social costs.
Private bargaining relies on the allure of mutual gain to induce the exchange of material information, but each party also
has an incentive to hide facts from the other. The judicial process
employs the compulsory discovery of facts to determine "fair and
non-discriminatory" terms of access, but litigants can subvert discovery. Although one may doubt the likelihood that a court is
better able than the parties themselves to determine the correct
price, 20 8 one must realize that the free market does not exhibit
perfect price and output decisions. 20 9 The additional error, if
any, introduced by adjudication, must be balanced against the potential benefits of enforcing the Sherman Act. In formulating
standards of legality, one must anticipate errors and design a
standard to compensate for them.2 10 One who believes bargaining parties typically exchange substantially all relevant information and rarely reach inefficient or anticompetitive results will
wish courts to apply strict standards that err on the side of not
disturbing the outcome of the bargaining process. On the other
hand, one who believes that monopolists can profitably engage in
inefficient denials of access will wish courts to apply loose stan21
dards that err on the side of compelling access. '
Two factors indicate that courts should adopt stricter, rather
than looser, standards. First, one expects firms to make all avail207. See, e.g. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 380-81
(1973) (defendant may refuse to deal with plaintiff if transaction would harm
defendant's economic viability).
208. Frank H. Easterbrook, On Identifying Exclusionary Conduct, 61 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 972, 977 (1986) ("[J]udges hearing antitrust cases have a lousy

record in separating economic wisdom from fallacy .... ); Werden, supra note
44, at 473-74 (courts probably lack expertise necessary to distinguish industryspecific attributes that make denials of access welfare harmful).
209. Ratner, supra note 24, at 381.
210. See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 47, at 253. The authors believe
that current econometric tools enable courts to adopt objective standards of illegality. Id.
211. Id. at 253 n.140.
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able, efficient transactions. 21 2 Second, most allegedly anticompetitive acts are neither wholly anticompetitive nor do they wholly
promote efficiency. Rather, they tend to fall in a vast gray area
between the two extremes, 2 13 and making all such behavior potentially illegal would hamper commercial activity. For these reasons, courts should employ strict standards for demonstrating the
illegality of a refusal to deal and examine the facts carefully for
anticompetitive indicia such as the event precipitating the refusal,
its terms, and the firms to which it applies and to which it does
214

not.

In applying strict standards, courts should look at the special
circumstances that will probably attend refusals to deal in the
NREN industry. These circumstances include the effect of the
network externality in creating monopoly power; the precedent
favoring access to the marketplace; the unique incentives of carrier monopolists to make inefficient refusals to deal with information providers; and the ability of a court to detect a price squeeze
in the sale of a fungible service such as telecommunications transmission. If courts give the appropriate weight to these factors,
even strict standards will probably not result in decisions that uphold a defendant's inefficient refusal to deal.
VI.

VALID BUSINESS REASONS FOR REFUSAL TO DEAL

A network that refuses to deal with an information provider
faces no liability under the Sherman Act if it bases its refusal on a
valid business reason. 2 15 This part explores the economic rationale that distinguishes valid from invalid reasons and examines the
factors that could justify refusals to deal by NREN carriers.

A.

Content Based Justifications

One rationale for a refusal to deal is content based discrimination. One glance at the back pages of computer magazines
reveals a host of online and mail-order suppliers of "adults-only"
212. Gerber, Note, supra note 30, at 1085 & n.79 (citing Ronald R. Coase,
The Problem of Social Cost, 3J.L. & EcON. 1 (1960)).
213. See Easterbrook, supra note 208, at 979 (stating that "[e]laborate
econometric measurements . . . may help answer the essential questions, but
often they are indeterminate").
214. BORK, supra note 24, at 337 (citing Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit &
Produce Bldg., Inc., 194 F.2d 484, 488 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 817
(1952).
215. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585,
610-11 (1985) (defendant incurred liability because it could not furnish business
motivation to justify its refusal to deal with plaintiff).
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graphics. Could a network justify a refusal to deal with an online
"peep show" because it feared liability for violation of obscenity
laws? What about other offensive content: Could a network refuse to deal with an electronic publisher that made libelous remarks? And what about publications that are offensive to the
great majority of network users, even though they are neither obscene nor libelous? This section explains the odd result under
the Sherman Act that a network or electronic publisher could refuse to deal with providers of content for the reason that such
content would be offensive, but not for the reason that it would
be obscene or libelous.
Prevention of liability for defamation, obscenity or negligence would seem to constitute valid business justifications for
refusals to deal. Whether such justifications are available to a defendant depends on whether the fear of liability is a realistic one.
Under the common law, a defendant is not liable for defamatory
or obscene content unless it makes editorial judgments regarding
content or has actual knowledge of the libelous or obscene nature
of the information it is publishing.21 6 Networks are merely carriers of information: they do not monitor or exercise control over
the content of the signals they carry. For this reason, considerations such as liability for obscenity, defamation or negligence
would seem not to justify a carrier's refusal to deal with an information provider. Such liability may pose a greater risk for information providers that exercise varying degrees of control over
their content, but the relevant case law shows that this risk re2 17
mains minimal.
216. NEUSTADT, supra note 36, at 112-13, 115.

217. For example, in Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135
(S.D.N.Y. 1991), an on-line data base incurred no liability for the defamatory
statements made in one of its electronic publications because it lacked editorial
control. Id. at 140.
A similar rationale applies when the proffered justification rests on potential
liability for negligence. In Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 968 F.2d
1110 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1028 (1993), the plaintiff's father
was murdered by a gunman hired through a classified advertisement in the defendant's magazine. Id. at 1112. The court held that a magazine could be liable
for causing the death only if "the advertisement on its face would have alerted a
reasonably prudent publisher to a clearly identifiable risk of harm to the public
that the advertisement posed." Id. at 1115. Because ODBs ordinarily have no
reason to know of the contents of its affiliated publications, they should rarely
face liability in such cases.
Such justifications, although viable, will probably form a second line of defense for ODBs. In an action under section two of the Sherman Act, a plaintiff
must first prove the defendant possesses monopoly power before the defendant
asserts a valid business justification. As discussed above, information providers
will probably not possess such power as long as they enjoy equal access to local
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ODBs would be justified in refusing to deal with information
providers whose content, if published by the ODB, would so offend its subscribers that they would stop doing business with it.
For example, courts have upheld newspapers' refusals to deal
with firms that operate adult theaters2 1 8 or engage in deceptive
2 19
advertising.
Courts will examine such justifications closely. For example,
in America's Best Cinema, the defendant, a general-interest newspaper, refused to publish the titles of movies shown at adult theaters, although it agreed to publish their names and telephone
numbers. 22 0 In finding the defendant's refusal justified under
Section II of the Sherman Act, the court noted that a significant
factor establishing the reasonableness of the defendant's refusal
was that it did not wholly cease dealing with the theaters, but
merely restricted the content of the advertisements. 22 '
networks. In such circumstances, the defendant's first line of defense will be a
motion for summary judgment upon the plaintiff's failure to produce evidence
of market power, and consequently the court should never reach the issue of
valid business justification.
218. America's Best Cinema Corp. v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 347 F.
Supp. 328, 333-34 (N.D. Ind. 1972) (finding that newspaper's advertising policy
restricting content of advertisements for adult theaters did not violate Sherman
Act).
219. Homefinders of Am., Inc. v. Providence Journal Co., 621 F.2d 441,
444 (1st Cir. 1980) (finding that newspaper's refusals to run deceptive advertisement did not violate Sherman Act).
Networks would also be justified in refusing to publish information that
would so offend the sensibilities of a network's customers that they would stop
doing business with it. But if high speed telecommunications networks enjoy
local monopolies and low demand elasticity, it would be hard to see how such a
concern could arise. Nevertheless, several decisions have allowed telephone
companies to refuse to deal with so-called "dial-a-porn" services. See, e.g.,
Information Providers' Coalition for Defense of First Amendment v. F.C.C., 928
F.2d 866, 879 (9th Cir. 1991) (allowing scrambling of "indecent" telephone
messages). These cases deal with duties arising under the First Amendment
rather than the Sherman Act, so their applicability as precedent for justifications
under the Act is purely speculative.
220. America's Best Cinema Corp., 347 F. Supp. at 331.
221. Id. at 333. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
brought similar scrutiny to bear on a newspaper that refused to deal with two
advertisers the newspaper accused of engaging in deceptive advertising. In
Homefinders, Inc. v. Providence Journal Co., 621 F.2d 441 (1st Cir. 1980), the
court found the defendant newspaper's refusal to deal justified because the advertiser did actually engage in deceptive advertising. Id. at 443-44. In a subsequent case, however, the court found no justification for the newspaper's refusal
to deal with a second advertiser because the newspaper based its refusal on an
unwarranted and incorrect assumption that the second advertiser was also engaging in deceptive advertising, noting that it operated a business similar to that
of the first advertiser. Home Placement Serv., Inc. v. Provident Journal Co., 682
F.2d 274 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1028 (1983).
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No "Free Rides"

A second broader rationale for a refusal to deal is the desire
to prevent "free-riding."
When one firm gains an advantage
from another without compensating the second firm, it is said to
receive a "free-ride." This free-rider effect distorts the economic
signals that promote economic efficiency. 22 2 A firm that receives
a subsidized service will demand more of it, but when the revenue
of the firm providing the service begins to decline, that firm
reduces its output. 22 3 Thus, because of free-riding, firms may de22 4
cline to offer certain beneficial services.
Business justifications for refusals to deal all ultimately
amount to claims that the plaintiff is attempting to gain a free
ride. 22 5 This is true whether the defendant alleges the plaintiff
will be unjustly enriched or the defendant will suffer irreparable
harm.

226

222. Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210,
222-23 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (discussing economic effects of free-riding on interstate
carriage), cert denied, 479 U.S. 1033 (1987).
223. Id.
224. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55
(1977) (stating that "[blecause of market imperfections such as the so-called
'free rider' effect, these services might not be provided ... in a purely competitive situation").
225. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585,
593 n.14 (1985).
226. Rothery Storage & Van Co., 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1033 (1987), illustrates free riding of the first type. In Rothery, the
defendant operated a nationwide moving van line through local subcontractors.
Id.at 211. The defendant refused to allow local agents to deal with any other
competing van lines. Id. The local moving companies executed a standard
agency contract with Atlas. Id. These types of contracts typically bar an agent
affiliated with a particular van line from dealing with any other line. Id.The
court found this arrangement valid because it made the defendant's company
more efficient, rather than decreasing the output of services. Id. at 223.
The local agents realized important benefits from their association with the
nationally recognized operation, such as obtaining equipment, services and contacts they could use when operating for their own accounts. Id. at 221-22. Because the subcontracting arrangement created efficiency that would not have
existed in the presence of free riding, and because free riding could not be prevented by any means short of a refusal to deal, the court found the refusal justified. Id. at 222-23 (refusing to invalidate contracts because they enhanced
consumer welfare by creating efficiency).
America's Best Cinema Corp. v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 347 F. Supp.
328 (N.D. Ind. 1972), illustrates the second type of free riding. In this case, a
newspaper refused to advertise film titles for adult movie theaters, permitting
them to run advertisements using their signatures and telephone numbers only.
Id. at 331. The rationale behind the newspaper's decision was that running the
complete advertisements would cause a reduction in circulation that would in
turn cause a loss of advertising revenue that would more than offset the gain
from running the theaters' full advertisements. In effect, the adult theaters
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Because of the harm caused by the free-rider effect, antitrust
policy allows firms to refuse to deal with rivals who seek to deal
on terms that amount to free-riding. 22 7 Consequently, courts
must not impose a duty to deal when doing so forces the firms to
give competitors a free ride. 22 8 To this end, courts engage in de-

tailed examinations of whether the refusal to deal actually increases efficiency and whether it is reasonably necessary to
achieve this efficiency.22 9 Courts tend to examine closely the specific facts of each case to determine whether a particular transaction would result in a free ride. 230
C.

Lack of Capacity

A firm may refuse to deal with a competitor if it lacks sufficient capacity to provide the service the competitor seeks. 23 '
Lack of capacity is merely another way of stating that the defendant considers the plaintiff's suggested price of access insufficient 23 2 because the defendant could, for the right price, add
would receive a free ride by not bearing the newspaper's full cost of providing
such advertisements. Accordingly, the court found the newspaper's terms of
dealing justified. Id. at 333-34.
227. See, e.g. Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 797
F.2d 370, 377 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding defendant's refusal to supply vendor list
to rival justified by free rider concerns), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 934 (1987); Rothery
Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 223 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(justifying exclusivity provisions on basis of free rider concerns), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1033 (1987) .
228. See Rothery Storage & Van Co., 792 F.2d at 223 (recognizing menace that
free riding poses to effectiveness of provision of interstate carriage services).
229. For further discussion of the elements of a cause of action under the
Sherman Act, see supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
230. See, e.g. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery &
Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 297-98 (1985) (recognizing that not all concerted
refusals to deal warrant per se liability); United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc.,
629 F.2d 1351, 1387 (5th Cir. 1980) (closely examining defendant's role in market to determine if restrictive practices promoted efficiency producing economic
activities); Rogers v. Douglas Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc., 266 F.2d 636, 644 (5th
Cir.) (stating that conduct must appear to be reasonably calculated to prejudice
public interest before finding it unreasonably restrains trade), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 833 (1959); Asheville Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc. v. FTC, 263 F.2d 502, 510
(4th Cir. 1959) (analyzing evidence to determine if restraint of trade occurred).
231. Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce Building, 194 F.2d, 484,
487 (1st Cir. 1952) (stating that lack of available space in building would justify
defendant's refusal to rent to plaintiff); Florida Fuels, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co.,
717 F. Supp. 1528, 1535 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (stating that lack of available storage
capacity would be valid defense to defendant's refusal to share petroleum storage tanks with plaintiff).
232. See Tye, supra note 47, at 360 ("Technical objections or concerns over
congestion of the facility are in reality part of a larger class of 'efficiency' defenses ....").
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capacity so long as its facilities have not already reached their op253
timal size.

When a facility reaches its optimal size, adding capacity
wastes resources. 2 4 One may doubt that a court can determine
better than the parties themselves whether a network's refusal to
deal is due to the fact that its facilities have reached optimal size.
The same reasoning with regard to price squeezes 23 5 applies to
the capacity problem, and hence courts should adopt stricter,
rather than looser, standards of illegality.236
VII.

CONCLUSION

Inefficient refusals to deal are rare, but the conditions that
seem likely to exist in the NREN may make such refusals more
likely to occur there than in other industries. Carriers will face
incentives to extend their monopolies into the information-services sector, but vertical integration may also have beneficial effects on efficiency and welfare. Courts must look carefully at the
claims of providers who allege that a carrier has refused to deal
with it in violation of the Sherman Act, or they may compel the
carrier to grant access to inefficient providers.
Courts will probably view claims of inefficient refusals to deal
skeptically because firms theoretically take advantage of all efficient transactions, and much behavior that could be anticompetitive could also be efficient. However, in judging these claims,
courts should also keep in mind the unusual features of the
NREN that increase the likelihood of inefficient refusals to deal.
These features include the network externality phenomenon,
which adds to the market power of the incumbent network, the
233. Gerber, Note, supra note 30, at 1111.
234. Id.
235. For a discussion of price squeezes, see supra notes 188-207 and accompanying text.
236. Even under stricter standards, defendants may not often be able to
hide inefficient refusals to deal behind false claims of inadequate capacity. The
discussion supra, notes 164-70, explained that, in the cable television industry,
increasing the number of channels on a monopoly cable television network
would not increase the number of network viewers, but would merely redistribute the number watching each channel. If the same phenomenon affects the
NREN, then the addition of information providers will not increase the number
of users, but will only change the number using any particular provider. Therefore, the network would not need to enlarge its facilities in order to accommodate the additional providers. The carrier would only have to provide additional
interfaces for the providers, a cost which would be borne by the providers themselves. If this represents the conditions in the NREN industry, lack of capacity
will seldom, if ever, justify a network's refusal to deal with an information
provider.
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open-access policy that antitrust law applies to the marketplace,
and the incentives that monopolist carriers have to carry fewer
information providers than they would if they competed with
other carriers for subscribers. Only by weighing all of these factors will courts reach decisions that will ensure that the NREN
provides optimal access and, consequently, the greatest benefit to
the economy.
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